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STUMP V SPARKMAN AND THE HISTORY OF
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Most developed legal systems, including our own, have long reflected a belief that suits against judges by dissatisfied litigants are an
unsatisfactory method of correcting judicial error. In the common law,
that belief became the doctrine of judicial immunity. In recent years,
traditional immunity doctrines have been criticized more and more,
especially by activist sectors of the bar and academe;' naturally, judi2
cial immunity has not avoided censure.

In Stump v. Sparkman,3 decided in 1978, the Supreme Court held
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that a judge is absolutely immune from suits for damages for his judicial acts, unless he acted in the clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction. No doubt the Court intended to affirm the validity of the doctrine
of judicial immunity, but the most apparent effect of the Sparkman
decision has been to reduce the stature of the doctrine and to call into
question the integrity of the judiciary and of the judicial process. Writers in both the popular and the scholarly press4 responded sharply
(aroused perhaps not so much by the decision itself as by the facts of
the case, which involved the involuntary sterilization of a fifteen-yearold girl), attacking the decision as an example of the worst sort of selfdealing by the judiciary and arguing that judicial immunity as it now
stands cannot find its justification in public policy.
In one of the more dispassionate of these articles, 5 two authorsJay Feinman and Roy Cohen-examine the history of judicial immunity. They conclude that "English law began with a position of general
judicial liability and developed only limited exceptions on grounds that
are irrelevant to a discussion of judicial liability today."' 6 These authors also discuss the policies underlying the judicial immunity doctrine: "We conclude that immunity is indefensible on policy grounds
as well, but that conclusion does not convince us that any of the suggested reforms should be adopted. Instead, we draw on contemporary
jurisprudential thinking to argue that no convincing policy resolution is
'7
possible."
An examination of the history of the doctrine of judicial immunity
leads to quite contrary conclusions. English law began not from a position of general judicial liability for damages but from a position of very
limited liabilities that resulted in only nominal penalties. 8 Moreover,
the doctrine of judicial immunity was developed primarily to eliminate
collateral attacks on judgments and to confine procedures in error to
the hierarchy of the king's courts; these grounds are relevant to discussions of judicial immunity today and are especially relevant to an analysis of Sparkman. Finally, this history does lead to a legitimate
4. See, ag., Falk, The Mandarins: Judges Seek Shieldfrom Fublic, Wall St. J., Apr. 28,
1978, at 16, col 3; Laycock, Civil JRights and Civil L'berties, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 390 (1977);
Nagel, JudiciallmmunityandSovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237 (1978); Nahmod, Persons
Who Are Not "Persons Absolute lndividualhmmunity Under Section 1983,28 DEPAUL L. REv. 1
(1978); Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine ofJudicialIlnunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833
(1978); Young, Supreme CourtReport, 64 A.B.A.J. 740 (1978); Note, Torts--Judicallmmunly. A
Swordfor the Maliciousor a Shieldfor the Conscientious?,8 U. BAIT. L. REv. 141 (1978); 11 IND.
L. REv. 489 (1978); 47 U. Mo. KAN. CrrY L. REv. 81 (1978).
5. Feinman & Cohen.
6. Id. 203.
7. Id. 204.
8. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
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resolution of conflicting policies, and to a reform proposal that implements the policies underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity. These
policies in turn show, as argued below,9 that the error the Court committed in Sparkman was not the perpetuation of the doctrine of judicial
immunity, as some critics have asserted,' 0 but rather the misstatement,
misinterpretation, and misapplication of the doctrine.

A.

I. THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
The English Origins of the Doctrine: JudicialImmunity and the
Development ofAppellate Procedures.

Disappointed suitors will exert pressure upon Eny legal system to
provide relief for the mistakes of its judges. The relief provided, however, will not necessarily take the form of appellate proceedings as we
know them today. In early English law, the now familiar proceedings
in error by appeal from one court to a higher court were completely
unknown. A litigant challenged the correctness of a decision by an accusation against those who decided the case; for instance, a complaint
against the verdict of a jury took the form of a charge of perjury under
the procedure of attaint. 1' Under Anglo-Saxon law of the tenth and
eleventh centuries, a judgment (doom) could be impeached by charging
the official proposing the judgment (the doomsman) with falsehood.
This proceeding, known as "forsaking the doom," developed into the
complaint of "false judgment," whereby a dissatisfied litigant obtained
a writ commanding the challenged court to cause a record of its proceedings to be made and brought before the court of the litigant's superior lord. The complainant could accept the court's record and thus
confine the issues to errors of law. But this record could be challenged
by anyone willing to engage in physical combat with the champions of
the challenged court. If the challenge succeeded, the lower court's
2
judgment was annulled and the court was amerced.1
9. See notes 197-233 infra and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Feinman & Cohen 204; Nagel, supra note 4, at 238-39; Rosenberg, supranote 4,
at 836; Young, supra note 4, at 740; Note, supra note 4, at 156-58; 47 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. Rav.
81, 81, 94 (1978).
11. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 214, 337-42 (3d ed. 1922); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 665 (2d ed. 1898).
12. An "amercement" was a pecuniary penalty, the amount of which was imposed at the

discretion of the king's court. These penalties were payable to the assessing court, not to the
complaining litigant. Amercements were small and frequent. "Most men in England must have
expected to be amerced at least once a year." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 11, at

513. For these reasons, liability for amercement is not comparable to liability for damages.
The author is unaware of any example of assessment of damages against a court of any kind
for a judicial act performed within jurisdiction. Coke does not mention damages in his discussion
of the Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 19, which made false judgment a royal plea.
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These challenges to the record were costly and lengthy. Moreover,
the fact that the challenged court-rather than the successful party to
the original action-had to defend against the action of false judgment
meant that such actions could be, and often were, brought to intimidate
a judge. 13 Gradually, false judgment proceedings were transformed:
combat was avoided (usually by agreement of the parties), and both
parties were heard on review, 14 but the burdensome attacks on the record were still possible.
Other features of the system of correcting errors by false judgment
were also unsatisfactory to the central government. False judgments in
the local courts were redressed in the court of the lord immediately
superior to the original court, and the appeal proceeded upwards
through the ranks of the feudal courts. 15 This meant that the king's
courts received no amercements from lower courts and could redress
errors only after long delays, if at all. That the system of false judgment did not permit an authoritative declaration of law by the central
government also became apparent when compared with the ecclesiastical courts:
In the twelfth century, under the influence of the canon law, Englishmen became familiar with appeals (appelationes) of a quite other
kind [than criminal appeals of felony]; they appealed from the archdeacon to the bishop, from the bishop to the archbishop, from the
archbishop to the pope. The graduated hierarchy of ecclesiastical
courts became an attractive model. The king's court profited by this
new idea; the king's court ought to stand to the local courts in somewhat the same relation as16that in which the Roman curia stands to
the courts of the bishops.
The attractiveness of the ecclesiastical model lay in its hierarchical
structure. Both a hierarchical system of review and a horizontal one (in
which rehearing is by another inferior court) offer correction of errors,
but proceedings in a hierarchical system enable the higher court to authoritatively ascertain and declare legal precepts. 17 For the judges of
the king's courts to stand in such a hierarchical relation to the local
courts, they needed to monopolize the existing means of correcting errors, the complaint of false judgment. By statute, therefore, false judg13.
IN CIV.
(1926).
14.
15.
16.
17.

See Statutes of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 28; R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE
CASES 31 (1941); Riddell, ErringJudges ofthe Thirteenth Century,24 MICH. L. REV. 329
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 667.
See 2 E. COKE, INsTrrTEs OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 138 (1642).
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 664 (footnotes omitted).
R. POUND, suIpra note 13, at 3.
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ment was made a royal plea, which could be heard only in the king's
courts.18

A judgment of a king's court could not be challenged through a
complaint of false judgment, however, because of the doctrine of the
sanctity of records. From a very early time, the proceedings of the
king's court had been written in Latin on rolls of parchment. 19 This
process of recording, coupled with royal prerogative, led to the view
that the king's record of factual findings concerning what took place
before him, whether maintained on parchment or stated viva voce, was
superior to every other record. This very useful doctrine of the finality
of the record was first applied in the court in which the king sat in
person, and remained with the king's courts as they expanded their
functions.2 0 The doctrine of the sanctity of records of courts of record,
which originated by virtue of royal prerogative, thus survived because
it eliminated time-consuming attacks on the findings of fact in the rec2
ord. 1
Nonetheless, the need for correction of the royal courts' errors of
law remained; indeed, it increased as the local courts dwindled and
were replaced by the royal justices of the peace and assizes. Inevitably
a method for correcting the errors of the royal courts developed in response. Because a complainant could not challenge the truth of the
king's courts' findings of fact,
the only manner in which such a complaint could be distinctly formulated was [for a complainant] to look at the formal record of the
case, and indicate clearly some error or errors [of law] appearing
thereon. It followed therefore that a complainant could only succeed
if he could point out an error on the record....

The first step was

the removal of the record into the higher court. Then came the assignment of errors by the plaintiff in error, the summoning of the
defendant in error by writ of Scire Facias to hear the errors assigned,
the question whether the errors so asand the joinder of issue 2on
2
signed were really errors.
Thus the writ of error came into being.
18. "None from henceforth, except our Lord the King, shall hold in his Court any Plea of
false Judgement, given in the Court of his Tenants; for such Plea specially belongeth to the Crown
and Dignity of our Lord the King." Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 19.
19. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supranote 11, at 169.
20. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 666. Courts that kept such formal Latin
records became known as "courts ofrecord." "Coke deduced from certain vague dicta in the Year
Books as to the powers of courts of record the new rule that it was only a court of record which
could fine and imprison." 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 159 (1927). Although Coke's view had little or no effect at the time, it has since been accepted. See 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Courts 709 (4th ed. 1975).
21. See Feinman & Cohen 205-06.
22. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 214. Prior to the development of the writ of error,
redress, when given, was at the instance of the central court and the king. Justices of assize and
justices in eyre were summoned before the central court for the correction of errors.
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In the development of the writ of error lay the seeds of the doctrine of judicial immunity. Although the benefits of finality that the
doctrine of the sanctity of records brought about appeared most clearly
in the context of proceedings in error, the scope of the doctrine was not
confined to that context. The factual findings of a court of record could
not be traversed by anyone in any proceeding, whether the proceeding
was appellate in nature or a collateral attack.
In the case of courts of record ...it was held, certainly as early as
Edward III.'s reign [1326-1377], that a litigant could not go behind
the record, in order to make a judge civilly or criminally liable for an
abuse of his jurisdiction. This is shown by a case reported in one of
the books of Assizes, which runs as follows: "J de R was arraigned
for that, whereas he was a justice to hear and terminate felonies and
trespasses, and whereas certain persons were indicted for trespass, he
made entry in his record that they were indicted for felony. And
judgment was demanded for him [for all that he did] from the time
that he was justice by commission, and that which he [the accuser]
presents will be to undo his record, which cannot be by law, if to such
a presentment the law puts him to answer. And it was the opinion of
the justices that the presentment was bad." The only recourse open
to the suitor in such a case was to attack the [legal conclusions in the]
record by writ of error, founded either on the record or on a bill of
23
exceptions to a ruling of the judge.
Other cases from the Year Books show that it was soon accepted
that no action would lie against a judge of record for that which he did
as judge. 24 The cases reveal that judicial immunity was an integral part
of the development of a hierarchical appellate system in England. The
doctrine of the sanctity of records had provided the legal system with a
necessary, though limited, finality by eliminating attacks on the record.
It enabled, in Coke's phrase, an "end of causes. '2 5 Under the old procedure of false judgment, that end came only after long delays, if at all.
The monopolization of procedures in error by the king's courts was
intended in part to remedy this situation; it was also intended to give
the royal courts the last word in legal controversies, thus adding another dimension to the concept of finality: authoritativeness.
23. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 235-36 (2d ed. 1937) (the second and
third bracketed interpolations are Holdsworth's). Note that the holding of the case is limited to

criminal actions in which the accusation would traverse the record of the defendant judge. The
holding would not apply to extrajudicial criminal actions.

It is noteworthy that a statute gave an action against a judge who refused to record a bill of
exceptions. Statutes of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 31.

24. These cases are reported in law French. For discussions in English of the cases, see Floyd
v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607). See also Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395, 40809 (N.Y. 1811).
25. See text accompanying notes 32-39 infra.
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In sum, as the hierarchical appellate system developed, the king's
courts found that attacks on the record of the royal courts were unnecessary and intolerably wasteful. The doctrine of the sanctity of records

thus came to be established and lent a degree of finality to judgments.
The system of appeal which these steps created had to monopolize the

correction of errors in order to be authoritative; 26 collateral attacks
framed as actions against judges were therefore eliminated by the de-

velopment of the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity fol-

lowed naturally from the doctrine of the sanctity of records 27 but was
ultimately accepted because it strengthened the appellate system by
28
cutting off collateral attacks on judgments.

B.

The Development of the Doctrine of JudicialImmunity.

1. The Restriction of Immunity to JudicialActs. (a) Lord Coke:
Floyd v. Barker.2 9 The failure of the common law courts to administer
effectively the criminal law led to the subsequent growth of the courts
of the Privy Council and the Star Chamber. The success of those

courts attracted more business. As part of the rivalry that thus developed, the common law courts' supporters, especially Lord Coke, tended

to magnify various consequences of the common law courts' status as
courts of record. 30 In Floyd v. Barker31 Coke established the immunity
26. The usual procedure for the correction of justices' errors was to bring a writ of error in
the King's Bench. In the case quoted in the text accompanying note 23 supra,the criminal action
against the justice was brought before justices of assizes. The cases from the Year Books (see note
24 supra) were actions brought in the Court of Common Pleas.
It could be argued that the doctrine of judicial immunity did not make the monopolization of
proceedings in error by the king's courts complete, since it applied only to courts of record. The
point is insignificant. There is no example of an action for damages against a judge of a court not
of record from Bracton's time to the nineteenth century, when it was held that such an action
would not lie. See, e.g., Haggard v. Peicier Fr~res, [18921 A.C. 61 (P.C.); Calder v. Halket, 13
Eng. Rep. 12 (P.C. 1839-40). Moreover, false judgment was much less significant after the time of
Edward I. Local courts, especially courts baron, were on the decline by the fourteenth century.
Justices of the peace, who were judges of courts of record, took their places. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 201.
27. See Feinman & Cohen 205-06.
28. The policy underlying judicial immunity was therefore not simply "a technical proposition concerning the nature of the record of a court of record," as Feinman and Cohen suggest. Id.
206. Nor is it true that "[b]oth judicial and executive immunity are common law doctrines with a
similar origin in the monarchical concept of sovereign immunity." Nagel, supra note 4, at 249.
29. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).
30. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 20, at 158-61.
31. Barker was a judge of assize who had presided over the trial of William Price for the
murder of one Hugh ap William. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Barker gave the
judgment of death, which the sheriff later carried out. One Rice ap Evan ap Floyd laid charges
against Barker, the grand jury that indicted Price, the jury that convicted Price, the sheriff who
executed Price, the justices of the peace who examined Price, and the witnesses against Price. The
charges in the Star Chamber were for conspiracy, or false accusation. See id. 203-05. It was held
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of judges of courts of record, thus ensuring the independence of those
courts from review by their newer rivals, especially the Star Chamber,
which were under the control of the king. In so doing, Coke stated for
the first time what are now considered the modem public policy bases
of the doctrine of judicial immunity.3 2 First,
[I]f the judicial matters of record should be drawn in question...
there never will be an end of causes: but controversies will be infinite; et infinitum injurereprobatur .... 33
Second, Coke noted that
insomuch as the Judges of the realm have the administration of justice, under the King, to all his subjects, they ought not to be drawn
into question for any supposed corruption, which extends to the annihilating of a record, or of any judicial proceedings before them...
except it be before the King himself; for they are only to make an
account to God and the King, and not to answer to any suggestion in
the Star-Chamber. .... 34
Third, a judge's having to answer to a collateral court such as the Star
Chamber
35
would tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice.
And fourth,
those who are the most sincere, would not be free from continual
calumniations .... 36
Coke's policy bases for judicial immunity can be summarized as follows: (1) the need for finality (which, as discussed earlier,37 covers at
least two policy concerns); 38 (2) the need for protecting the indepenthat those involved in Price's prosecution could not be charged with conspiracy. 77 Eng. Rep. at
1306.
32. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306-07.
33. Id. at 1306.
34. Id. at 1307.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
38. Feinman and Cohen suggest that this first policy stated by Coke is a "floodgates" argument.
One of his reasons is still today the principal policy argument advanced for judicial
immunity--the potential for a multiplicity of suits, frivolous and otherwise, against
judges. . . . The difficulty with this formulation is identical to the difficulty with similar
arguments in later times; any rule other than an absolute rule of immunity for all judges
that gives no consideration to jurisdiction or the nature of the act committed has the
potential for generating suits of great, if not "infinite," numbers.
Feinman & Cohen 208. According to their interpretation, "infinite," as used by Coke in the
quoted section (see the text accompanying note 33 supra), is synonymous with "countless." Coke's
concern for "an end of causes," however, (and the common laws concern for finality) suggests
that, in this instance, "infinite" actually means "endless." Coke was not making a floodgates
argument but a finality argument. See 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306.
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dence of common law courts from rival courts controlled by the king;39
(3) the need for maintaining public confidence in the system of justice;
and (4) a recognition that independent, conscientious judges would be
most subject to prosecutions in the Star Chamber.
Coke also stated a limiting principle in Floyd v. Barker: a judge is
immune "for any thing done by him as Judge."4° This restriction of
immunity to judicial acts, in one form or another, continues to be applied by today's courts, including the Supreme Court.4 1 The statement
appears to define the scope of judicial immunity as encompassing all
the official acts of a judge, but the history of the judicial-act requirement after Coke's time shows that the concept was more specific and
limited.
(b)

hejudicial-actrequirementafterLord Coke. Until rather re-

cently, most functions of the British government were carried out by
the justices of the peace. The duties of these judicial officers have his-

torically been classified as either judicial or ministerial. As Clerk and
Lindsell's statement of the dichotomy reveals, "ministerial" is not synonymous with "administrative": 42
Officers of courts of justice act either judicially or ministerially. A
judicial act is one which involves the exercise of a discretion, in
which something has to be heard and decided. A ministerial act is
one which the law points out as necessary to be done under the circumstances, without leaving any choice of alternative courses. 43
Three hundred years earlier, Dalton had described the duties of a jus-

tice of the peace in almost identical terms:
The Power and Authority of the Justices of Peace . .. is in some
cases Ministeriall or Regular, and limited as a Minister onely; and in
some other cases Judiciall or Absolute, and as a Judge.
39. Feinman and Cohen believe that this policy argument "concerned the necessity of maintaining respect for the judiciary and the government." Feinman & Cohen 209. One should differentiate this second policy argument from the third.
The distinction between judicial responsibility for judicial acts to the king under the king's
power of appointment, and possible subjection to criminal prosecution for judicial acts was clearly
drawn by Coke, who relied on the case of J de R from the books of Assizes (see the text accompanying note 23 supra) for the assertion that "as a Judge shall not be drawn in question in the cases
aforesaid, at the suit of the parties, no more shall he be charged in the said cases before any other
Judge at the suit of the King." 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307.
40. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978).
42. De Smith calls administrative acts "particular," in contradistinction to legislative acts,
which are "general." S. DE SMrrH 31. In his view, "an administrative act is the making and issue
of a specific direction, or the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with
the requirements of policy." Id. Ministerial acts, on the other hand, are those actions, "the discharge of which involves no element of discretion." Id. 30.
43. J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, TORTS 1108 (14th ed. 1975).
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Ministeriall, when he is thereto commanded by a higher Authority:
As upon A Supplicavit...
IA Writ upon the Statute of Northhampton...
In the execution of which two writs, the Justice of Peace may
proceed no further, or otherwise, than he is authorized by such Writ;
and is also to returne the Writ, and to certifie his doings therein, into
the Court whence the Writ came.
But in all other cases within their authority, the power of the
Justices of Peace, seemeth to be Absolute (in some manner) so as
they and every of them, may of their owne power proceed ex officio,
and as a Judge; yet this their power is also limited, for they may
neither hang a man for a trespasse, nor fine him for a felony, but
must proceed in all things according as they are prescribed by the
Commission, and by the said severall Statutes. 4
This distinction was necessary to determine the appropriate means
of control by the King's Bench. Mandamus issued only to compel the
performance of ministerial duties, while certiorari and prohibition
could issue only to control the exercise of judicial power.45 Ministerial
actions were largely beyond the effective control of the King's Bench,
because such actions could not be restrained through certiorari and
prohibition. In their determination to supervise the actions of public
authorities, "the courts. . . chose to assume that [these new public authorities] were controllable in the same manner by means of certiorari
and prohibition. Hence almost all non-ministerial functions vested in
statutory bodies were treated as 'judicial' for the purpose of review by
'46
certiorari and prohibition.
The same classification used in the extension of judicial review of
administrative action was used also to determine whether the public
authority was immune from tortious liability. As to justices of the
peace, for example, Hawkins stated the rule thus:
Justices of the peace are not punishable civilly for acts done by them
in their judicial capacities, but if they abuse the authority with which
they are entrusted, they may be punished criminally at the suit of the
king by way of information. But in cases where they proceed ministerially rather than judicially, if they act corruptly, they are liable to
suit of the party, as well as to an information at the
an action at the 47
suit of the king.

44.
45.
46.
47.
In turn,

M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 23-24 (1643).
See generally Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L. J. 523 (1923).
S. DE SMITH 46.
3 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 8, § 74 (7th ed. 1795) (emphasis in original).
this statement was followed in Bum's manual for justices of the peace:
In the next place; he is not punishable at the suit of the party, but only at the suit of
the king, for what he doth as judge, in matters which he hath power by law to hear and
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This rule extending immunity to all of a justice's discretionary acts
cannot be regarded as anything but a mistake, for the administrative
duties of justices of the peace were extensive and diverse; in Maitland's
phrase, they were the "rulers of the county," 48 at least by the sixteenth
century. A justice's duties were all performed through the use of judicial procedures. Routine matters like bridge repairs, for example, were
handled through the machinery of the quarter sessions requiring charging, presentment, indictment, and trial, under the forms and rules of
the criminal law.4 9 Much of the work of a justice of the peace also
required some exercise of discretion. Thus, under the judicial-ministerial dichotomy, most of a justice's administrative acts were classified as
50
judicial and therefore qualified for absolute immunity as judicial acts.
Although it had early been recognized that an officer's discretion
5
was not absolutely unlimited in matters given over to his authority, '
the force of the distinction between judicial and ministerial actions remained. Administrative actions of justices, as long as they were discretionary, were protected within very wide limits. In time, Parliament
and the courts came to realize that drawing the line of liability according to the discretion with which a judicial officer could act resulted in
too much protection for the justices of the peace and the other inferior
judicial officers and tribunals that executed the great bulk of the laws of
Great Britain. In Bernardistonv. Some, 52 for example, the plaintiff argued that the sheriff of Suffolk had acted ministerially in making a
double return of an 'election writ. 53 The court decided that the sheriff
was acting as a judge in the declaring of a majority of the election, and
54
that no action would lie against a judge for what he did judicially.
This decision demonstrates the basic weakness in the judicialministerial dichotomy: Clearly the sheriff's duties were administrative
and had been circumscribed by statute; he had no discretion beyond
the application of arithmetic rules. Yet under the rule of Bernardiston,
almost any administrative action performed by an officer of justice
determine without the concurrence of any other, for regularly no man is liable to an
action for what he doth as judge: but in cases wherein he proceeds ministerially, rather
than judicially, if he acts corruptly, he is liable to an action at the suit of the party, as
well as to an information at the suit of the king.
2 R. BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 434 (3d ed. 1756).
48. F. MAITLAND, JUSTICE AND POLICE 80 (1885).
49. See id. 85-88; S. & B. WEBB, THE PARISH AND THE COUNTY 281 (1963 reprint).
50. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
51. See Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210 (C.P. 1598).
52. 83 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B. 1675).
53. The sheriff had been concerned that return of the election results as tallied would be
challenged in an action for false returns. He therefore returned two separate and contradictory
election results-a double return. Id. at 475.
54. Id. at 476.
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(even an officer like a sheriff, whose duties are usually ministerial)
could be characterized as judicial and thus be immunized. The outcry
against this decision resulted in the enactment of a statute that created
a cause of action against officials for making false returns willfully, or
55
for making double returns falsely, willfully, and malicously.
Over time, as more authority was entrusted to the justices of the
peace, seventeenth and eighteenth century courts also came to realize
that many of a justice's administrative duties were not judicial in the
accepted sense, and that the mere exercise of discretion should not automatically insulate a justice from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of his administrative powers. Courts facing problems of the
liability of justices of the peace relied less and less on the doctrine of
judicial immunity and more on judicial review of administrative acts.
Superior courts became more willing to deny immunity to justices of
the peace who maliciously abused their powers in administrative matters. A rule developed giving justices of the peace immunity for judicial functions exercised in good faith, even when not exercised in a
court of record;5 6 in practice this good faith immunity encompassed
many of their administrative duties.
There are numerous obier dicta in the case law to the effect that
justices are liable for malicious actions, and these are so broad in scope
that they seem to apply to both ministerial and judicial acts.57 These
dicta have led some critics of judicial immunity to argue that the English rule of immunity for judicial acts done within jurisdiction extended
only to judges of superior courts; their argument for an "actual malice"
standard of liability rests in part on assertions that "inferior judges
were liable for malicious acts within their jurisdiction."5 8 There are,
however, numerous equally broad dicta to the contrary.5 9 To reconcile
this apparent conflict, one must turn to the decisions. An examination
of the case law in Britain leads to the conclusion that inferior judicial
officers were held liable for malicious acts when they were not performing judicial functions as judges of courts of record. Most often the acts
55. An Act to prevent False and Double Returns of Members to serve in Parliament, 16951696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 7.
56. See Morgan v. Hughes, 100 Eng. Rep. 123 (K.B. 1788); Windham v. Clere, 78 Eng. Rep.
387 (Q.B. 1589). See also Thompson, JudicialImmuniy andthe ProtectionofJustices, 21 MOD. L.
REv. 517 (1958).
57. E.g., Rex v. Young & Pitts, 97 Eng. Rep. 447, 450 (K.B. 1758); Gerlington v. Pitfield, 84
Eng. Rep. 360 (K.B. 1669); Cave v. Mountain, 133 Eng. Rep. 330 (C.P. 1840).
58. Feinman & Cohen 218. See also Note, Immunity of Federaland State Judgesfrom CiPl
Suit, supra note 2; Yale Note.

59. E.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774); Green and the Hundred of
Buccle-churches Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P. 1589); Brittain v. Kinnaird, 129 Eng. Rep. 789, 792
(C.P. 1819).

Vol. 1980:879]

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

for which such magistrates were held liable were clearly administrative.6 0
Seen in perspective, then, the case of justices of the peace is not an
exception to or an evolution of the general rules of judicial immunity;
rather it is the case of an officer subjected to more than one rule of
immunity by the varied nature of his duties. Present-day judicial officers have administrative duties, although not as extensive as those of a
justice of the peace in former times, and their liability should also vary
61
in accordance with the nature of their duties.
(c) Later evolution of the judicial-act concept. As British courts
repeatedly tried to define the nature of a multitude of statutory functions (usually for the purpose of determining the proper scope of judicial review), they came to realize, late in the nineteenth century, that
the judicial-ministerial dichotomy was a caricature rather than a definition of official duties; that the duties of justices of the peace did, indeed,
include merely administrative functions; and that Parliament possessed
the power to vest in any public authority a combination of administra62
tive, legislative, and judicial functions.
Various definitions of a judicial act were developed; often, when a
definition appeared patently unsuitable in a particular context, the
courts would discard it and adopt another definition, also supposedly
universal in its application.6 3 Such flexibility resulted in ambiguities
and inconsistencies. A particular act or function might be called 'judicial" for purposes of review but be called "administrative" for purposes
of determining liablity.6 4
The courts eventually ceased their attempts to state a conclusive
test and came to rely on a flexible approach that emphasized the differ60. This is also the conclusion of Professor Thompson, who examined the question at some
length:
(1) A justice of the peace acts as a court of record when exercising summary criminal jurisdiction. As a judge of such a court he is protected in respect of all acts done
within his jurisdiction, whether maliciously or otherwise.
(2) In civil matters, if a justice is entrusted with the jurisdiction of a court [of] record, he will be similarly protected.
(3) A justice is protected only if he acts in good faith when he discharges judicial
functions other than as a court of record.
Thompson, supra note 56, at 533.
61. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-13 (1978). For a discussion of official and
derivative immunity and their varied applications, see Note, Derivative Immunity: An Unjustfed
Bar to Section 1983 Actions, 1980 DuKE L.J. 568.
62. See S. DE SMrrH 29. See also Boulter v. Justices of Kent, [1897] A.C. 556; Regina v.
Cornwall Quarter Sessions, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 906 (Q.B.); Newman v. Foster, 86 L.J.K.B. 360 (1916);
Huish v. Justices of Liverpool, [1914] 1 KCB. 109.
63.

S. DE SMITH 29.

64. See id. 50-51.
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ent characteristics of judicial, administrative, and legislative functions.65 Judicial functions were typically characterized by the exercise
of the power to make a binding and conclusive decision, the exercise of
power to hear and determine a controversy, the application of objective
standards for the determination of an issue, the declaration or alteration of the rights and obligations of individuals, and certain procedural
attributes. 66 Administrative functions, on the other hand, were directed

more toward public affairs and service than to disputes between individuals, and legislative functions were concerned with the institution of

a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases. 67 The
development and use of such guides for classification has been discussed elsewhere. 68 For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to

note that British courts realized that not all of a judge's official acts are
judicial, and that therefore not all of them should be protected by abso69
lute judicial immunity.

2.

The JurisdictionalLimit on Immunity. The restriction of juris-

dictional immunity to judicial acts, as developed by Lord Coke in Floyd
v. Barker, was followed shortly by another major opinion, The Marshalsea,70 in which Coke set forth a second limit on the doctrine. The

court of the Marshalsea had tried a case in assumpsit and had found
against the defendant, whose "bail," or surety, was imprisoned until the

judgment was paid. The surety then brought an action against the officers responsible for his imprisonment. Coke sustained the suit, finding that the Marshalsea court lacked jurisdiction over actions in
65. Even down to the nineteenth century the administrative and judicial functions of the
Justices were so intermingled that most writers give up the attempt to distinguish between them. We are told that "it is not easy to fix any rule for distinguishing, in the
abstract, between what things are the subject of orders of Justices, and what of convictions by them. Before the Statute of 4 Geo. II., convictions were always recorded in
Latin, whereas orders were returned in English; and we find this circumstance referred to
as a criterion. . . . Perhaps the only criterion that can be furnished for distinguishing
when penal proceedings are to be considered as orders, and when as convictions, is that
alluded to by Lord Hardwicke in R. v. Bissex, viz. whether they be so denominated by
the statute which gives the Justices jurisdiction to make them" (Burn's Justice ofthe
Peace, vol. v. p. 287 of edition of 1845).
S. & B. WEBa, supra note 49, at 281 n.l.
66. S.DE SMrrH 37-47.
67. Id. 31-34.
68. See generally Id 27-51; Gordon, 'Uldministrative"Tribunalsand the Courts, (pts. 1-2), 49
L.Q. REv. 94, 419 (1933).
69. Feinman and Cohen mention the limitation of judicial immunity to judicial acts but find
little distinction between that limitation and the limitation imposed by the requirement that a
judge act within his jurisdiction to retain immunity. See Feinman & Cohen 210. The two limitations are quite distinct. American courts have adopted the judicial act requirement with little
understanding, consequently overlooking the administrative-ministerial distinction. A discussion
of the jurisdictional limit follows in the text. See notes 70-96 infra and accompanying text.
70. 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (Star Chamber 1612). See also Feinman & Cohen 209-10.
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assumpsit, and consequently that proceedings conducted in the absence
of jurisdiction were void ab initio. For the latter proposition, Coke relied on the fifteenth-century case Bowser v. Collins,71 which stated that
an action taken by a court lacking the power to take it was coram non
judice (before a person who was not a judge). In fact, Bowser more
likely meant that such an action would be avoidable by plea, rather
72
than void.
Despite its lack of strong precedential underpinning, The Marshalsea was taken not only for the proposition that lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter renders a proceeding void ab initio, but also for the
further proposition that lack of subject matter jurisdiction makes a
judge liable for the consequences of his judicial acts. 73 Even this limitation on the doctrine of immunity, however, was undercut in subsequent cases.
In Peacock v. Bell 74 the burden of pleading and proving that the
judge of a superior court had exceeded his jurisdiction was placed on
the plaintiff. In Hamond v. Howell 75 the court refused to apply the
jurisdictional limit rule of The Marshalsea to a judge of a superior
court acting "quatenus a judge. ' 76 In 1692 Gwinne v. Poole77 established that an inferior court judge retained immunity unless he was
aware of facts suggesting a lack of jurisdiction.
71. Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pl. 11 (1483). See 77 Eng. Rep. at 1040. The opinions of
Judges Pigot and Suliard are partially translated from law French in 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 23, at 236.
72. See Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pl. 11, at 30 (Pigot, J.); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supranote
23, at 236-37.
73. See Dobbs 67-68; Note, Filling the Void- Judicial Power and JurisdictionalAttacks on
Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 164 (1977); and cases cited in notes 75, 77, &,90 infra.
74. 85 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1667).
75. 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (C.P. 1677).
76. Id. at 1037.
77. 125 Eng. Rep. 858 (C.P. 1692). In Judge Powell's view, his decision was not a modification of the rule of The Marshalsea,77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (Star Chamber 1612). He pointed out that
the court of the Marshalsea had jurisdiction only in cases in which the king's servants were parties;
as all parties were enrolled, the judge of that court should have known the character of all parties,
and could be culpable only from ignorance. 125 Eng. Rep. at 86. The argument is not completely
convincing, because Coke appeared to be more concerned in The Marshalseawith jurisdiction of
"the cause" than with personal jurisdiction.
The rule of Gwinne v. Poole combined with the rule of Peacock v. Bell to form a rule whose
operation was described by Judge Parke in the well-known case of Calder v. Halket:
It is well settled that a Judge of a Court of Record in England, with limited jurisdiction,
or a Justice of the Peace, acting judicially, with a special and limited authority, is not
liable to an action of trespass for acting without jurisdiction, unless he had the knowledge or means of knowledge of which he ought to have availed himself, of that which
constitutes the defect of jurisdiction.
13 Eng. Rep. 12, 36 (P.C. 1839-40).
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These cases developed a distinction between judges of inferior and

superior courts, although the distinction would not be fully stated for
another century. 78 Scholars have found it difficult to justify the rule of
The Marshalsea79 and almost impossible to reconcile the distinction
that subsequently developed between the complete immunity for judicial acts that was enjoyed by judges of superior courts with the immunity limited to acts within jurisdiction that was allowed judges of
80
inferior courts.

An understanding of what "jurisdiction" meant to courts of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and how it was used by them,
may be helpful. According to modem theories,81 a court's jurisdic-

tion-its power to decide a case--depends only upon its authority over
the subject matter of the general class of controversies of which the

particular dispute at hand is a member, the territorial limits on its
power, and its power over the person of the defendant. These elements

of a controversy are capable of initial determination by a court. If
these conditions are met the court has jurisdiction, and its decision,
even if erroneous, is binding unless and until an appellate court overturns its order. Under this theory the court's jurisdiction does not and
cannot depend on anything the court might do in its subsequent disposition of the case. In short, "[t]he jurisdiction of a court depends upon
its right to decide a case and never upon the merits of its decision. '8 2

These ideas did not prevail in the seventeenth century: the courts
of that era never developed a theory of jurisdiction. As an eminent
British writer explained, "the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for the purposes of judicial review has been one of public policy
rather than one of logic."'8 3 The kings' courts from the sixteenth cen78. That statement came in Miller v. Seare:
But it is said, that no actions will lie against persons acting in a judicial capacity. Let us
see how far this general position is warranted by law. 1st. It is agreed, that the Judges in
the King's Superior Courts ofjustice are not liable to answer personally for their errors
in judgment. And this, not so much for the sake of the Judges, as of the suitors themselves. [Citations omitted.] 2d. The like in Courts of general jurisdiction, as gaol-delivery, &c. [Citations omitted.] 3d. In Courts of special and limited jurisdiction, having
power to hear and determine, a distinction must be made. While acting within the line
of their authority, they are protected as to errors in judgment; otherwise they are not
protected.. . . In all the cases where protection is given to the Judge giving an erroneous judgment he must be acting as Judge.
96 Eng. Rep. 673, 674-75 (C.P. 1777) (emphasis added).
79. See Dobbs 68; Note, supra note 73, at 164-65.
80. See 6 W. HOLDSWORT-, supra note 23, at 238-40; Feinman & Cohen 214-18; Thompson,
supra note 56, at 520-23. Feinman and Cohen, for example, find that "[t]he law from the seventeenth century forward [is] somewhat confused ..
" Feinman & Cohen 217.
81. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY chs. 8-9 (1950); A. RuBINSTEIN, JURISDICTION AND ILLEGALrry 212-14 (1965).
82. Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 F. 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1913).
83.

S. DE SMITH 68.
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tury through the eighteenth century used prohibition and mandamus
against the ecclesiastical courts to require them to apply common law
and statutory rules of procedure and decision.8 4 The fiction that these
writs were used to confine those courts to their proper jurisdiction was
maintained by a requirement that an applicant for a writ of prohibition
allege that the king's interest was threatened. 85
In controlling the proceedings of justices of the peace and other
administrative tribunals, the practice of the King's Bench was even less
confined. Style's PracticalRegisterstated that "[the King's Bench] hath
authority to Quash Orders of Sessions, Presentments, Endictments &c
made in inferior Courts, or before Justices of the Peace, or other Commissioners, if there be cause, that is, if they be defective in matter or
form .... ,,86 This use of an expansive sense of "jurisdiction" was
made necessary by the shortcomings of the writ of error. Not all the
decisions of justices of the peace could be appealed by writ of error, but
only those "formal" or "plenary" decisions resulting in a traditional,
extensive record that could be examined in King's Bench.8 7 Statutes
had increased the use of summary proceedings by both justices of the
peace and the newer administrative tribunals; the records of these proceedings gave few details except the fact of the order.88 "[T]he significant fact is that it was held, or rather taken for granted, that error lay
neither to justices out of sessions, nor to all the new statutory tribunals,
such as the Commissioners of Sewers and Excise which came to life in
the sixteenth century. '8 9 The King's Bench could, however, effectively
review administrative decisions by the use of a prerogative writ if it
confined its review to jurisdictional defects. The eventual result was
almost inevitable, given the constraints of the writ system: "The plain
fact is that the High Court wanted to exercise as much control over
these administrative bodies as possible, and has greatly extended the
concept of jurisdiction for this purpose." 90
84. See Dobbs 60-61.
85. E. HENDERSON,

FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 120-31 (1963);

Gordon, The Observance of Law as a Condition of Jurisdiction, 47 L.Q. REV. 386, 393 (1931);
Jenks, supra note 45, at 528.
86. W. STYLE, REGESTUM PRACTICALE, OR, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER 455-56 (3d ed. 1694).
87. A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 81, at 63.
88. See J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 220 (3d ed. 1963).
89. A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 81, at 63. See also E. HENDERSON, supra note 85, at 8si-I 1o.
90. J. GRIFFITH & H. STEET, supra note 88, at 220. In a suit against certain judges of excise,
for example, a previous factual determination by the judges as to whether certain wines were "low

wines" or "strong wines" was held to be erroneous and outside the judges' jurisdiction. Terry v.
Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Ex. 1668). Compare Holmes's well-known "glanders" opinion in
Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). See also the companion case to Terry:
Papillon v. Buckner, 145 Eng. Rep. 556 (Ex. 1668).
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While this expansion of review authority over the jurisdictional
errors of administrative tribunals was taking place, a tremendous
growth in statutory law was underway. Much of this law created additional local administrative bodies and expanded the duties of the justices of the peace. 91 The increasingly pervasive effects on a local
society of these agents of the central government predictably put
greater pressure on the legal system to provide a tort remedy for those
damaged by administrative actions. Judicial immunity barred direct
suit against a justice of the peace for administrative actions-unless a
higher court found that the justice had acted without jurisdiction. The
jurisdictional limit on judicial immunity was therefore retained because its application to inferior judicial officers provided a tort remedy
for administrative wrongdoing. 92
With respect to judges of superior courts there was no comparable
need for a jurisdictional limit on immunity, because these courts played
little part in the administration of local government. In any case, a
jurisdictional limit on the immunity of superior court judges would
have had little practical effect, because courts of general jurisdiction
were, naturally enough, not subject to similar statutory jurisdictional
93
requirements.
Not until the twentieth century did common law courts develop an
adequate method of reviewing administrative action; 94 until that time,
administrative action within a court's jurisdiction was regarded as unreviewable by writ of error absent specific legislative provision for review. 95 The recent development of judicial review of administrative
action has now removed the need for the judicial control of administrative action by expansive use of the prerogative writs and of jurisdic-

tional fictions. 96 Similarly, the shift of administrative authority from

justices of the peace to statutory agencies during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries has removed the barriers of res judicata and judicial
immunity from the path of those seeking redress for damage from administrative action. As a result of these developments, the jurisdictional limit on judicial immunity no longer serves the purpose it served
for so many centuries; there is no longer any reason to distinguish between the immunity of superior and inferior court judges.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

S. & B. WEBB, supra note 49, at 387-424, 585-602.
See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, upra note 23, at 238.
See id. (quoting Peacock v. Bell, 85 Eng. Rep. 84, 87-88 (K.B. 1667)).
See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 152-92 (1965).
See generally J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, supranote 88, at 219-20, 237.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703 (1976). The implications of 7he Marshalsea,however, still

affect the concept ofjurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942); D. LOUISELL &

G. HAZARD, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 487-91 (3d ed. 1973).
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C.

The Doctrine of JudicialImmunity in America.

1. JudicialImmunity Before the Civil Rights Acts. The first major
reported American case involving judicial immunity was the Connecticut Supreme Court's 1804 decision in Phelps v. Sill.97 Feinman and
Cohen note that Phelps is "frequently ... regarded as the first American judicial liability case. . . ."98 In fact, at least three cases preceded
it. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1792 decided Ross v. Rittenhouse,99 a case involving events that occurred just before the ratification of the Constitution. Congress had passed a law encouraging the
states to set up state courts of admiralty, but directing that appeals from
the judgments of these courts be taken in the Court of Appeals of the
United States. Justice Shippen summarized both the facts and the
court's reasoning:
What is the case before us? A judge of an inferior [state] Court of
Admiralty condemns a prize, declares who are the captors, and orders a distribution accordingly. On appeal to the Superior Court of
Admiralty [a court of appeals of the United States], that Court
reverses his judgment, and directs a different distribution. The Judge
below refuses to obey the sentence, and persists in distributing the
proceeds of the prize agreeably to his own decree. A suit is brought
here, to compel the Judge to perform the decree of the Superior
Court. .

.

. Can ours be a proper Court to decide between the

sentences of two contending Courts of Admiralty, or to enforce the
97. 1 Day 315 (Conn. 1804).
98. Feinman & Cohen 226. Interestingly, the rule stated by the Connecticut court in Phelps
is absolute, but the rule of immunity that Judge Phelps's attorney suggested was one of qualified
immunity:
3. Phelps acted as a judge. As a judge he acted, in appointing Stanley; as a judge
he delivered to him the property; and throughout, he is treated as a judge. If so, no
action can be sustained against him, unless he acted maliciously andcorruptly. But, there
is no intention to injure stated in this declaration .... Nothing, from which malice can
be inferred, is stated.
An action will not lie against a judge, for an erroneous judgment. Though he mistook, it is sufficient for him, that he actedjudicially.
In all cases of this kind, where suits have been brought against officers, it seems to
have been agreed, that it was necessary to state malice.
I Day at 318-19 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In Note, Immunity of Federaland State Judgesfrom Civil Suit, supra note 2, at 731 n.20, the
author argues that the Connecticut court's statement that "no impurity of motive is imputed to
him, and none is to be inferred," 1 Day at 320, indicates that "proof of bad faith or malicious
intent might have led to a different result." A careful reading of Phelps v. Sill shows that the court
was concerned with the sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings and the classification of the judge's
duties. Counsel for the plaintiff had argued that some of the judge's duties were ministerial, I Day
at 322; counsel for the defendant had argued the contrary, id. at 318-19, but maintained that, in
any case, malice was not alleged, id. at 319. The statement the author quoted may therefore be
seen as disposing of the case on the grounds of insufficient pleadings, avoiding the question
whether the judge's actions were indeed ministerial
99. 2 Dall. 160 (Pa. 1792).
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sentence of either? It is in vain to say, the times were such, that the
Supreme Court could not, or would not, proceed to extremities with
the Judge of the inferior Court. We are not authorised to aid a defective, or unwilling jurisdiction, by assuming an extraordinary power,
unknown to the law. . . . In whatever light I view this question, I
am satisfied, that the Court of Common Pleas were incompetent to
carry into effect the decree of the reversal of the superior Court of
Appeals, and that an action for money, had and received against the
Judge who distributed the money according to his own decree, could
not be sustained in a Court of law.10 0
All the justices who authored opinions in Ross v. Rittenhouse agreed
that the Court of Common Pleas, as a common-law court, had no jurisdiction to carry out a judgment of a court of appeals acting in admiralty, "and also," added Chief Justice McKean, "that an action will not
lie against a Judge for what he does as such." 10
' Obviously the court's
decision did not rest on the doctrine of judicial immunity alone, but
Ross v. Rittenhouse is a clear example of application of the doctrine in
preventing improper collateral attack on a judgment.
Two South Carolina cases were also decided before Phe#ps v. Sill.
In Lining v. Bentham 0 2 the plaintiff sued a justice of the peace in an
action on the case for imprisoning him for contempt. Counsel for the
defendant justice urged the distinctions between a justice's ministerial
and judicial acts, and his liability for actions taken in those capacities.
The court held "that a justice of the peace is not answerable in an action for what he does by virtue of his judicial power."'' 0 3 The next case,
Brodie v. Rutledge,' °4 was an attempted suit for libel against the recently deceased Justice Rutledge. The report of the case is brief, but it
shows clearly that South Carolina adopted the English rule of complete
immunity from defamation accorded all judges for any words spoken
from the bench: "[No suit will lie against a judge for any opinion delivered by him in his judicial capacity, either supreme or
subordinate."1 05 The English rule of immunity for defamation was
broader than the general rules of judicial immunity; 0 6 the court's decision is thus not a rejection of the English distinction between the immunity accorded judges of superior courts and that granted judges of
inferior courts.
The Supreme Court did not face the issue of judicial immunity
100. Id. at 166 (opinion of Shippen, J.).
101. Id. at 164 (opinion of McKean, C.J.).
102. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 1 (1796). Justice Bay's reports were published in 1811.

103. Id at 7.
104. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 69 (1796).
105. Id. at 70.
106. See Thompson, supra note 56, at 518-20.
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until 1868.107 In the meantime, the doctrine of judicial immunity had
often been affirmed in state court decisions that are of little interest
today. Nevertheless, a brief summary of these decisions is necessary
because knowledge of the status of the doctrine in the common law of
the nineteenth century aids in understanding the context in which Congress enacted the 1871 Civil Rights Act.108 Some authors have underestimated that status. Feinman and Cohen assert that "American
courts . . . held many, if not most, judicial officers liable for their
wrongful acts much, if not most, of the time." 0 9 They are joined in
this evaluation of nineteenth century law by a student author who
states that the doctrine of judicial immunity was not uniformly accepted in state courts. This writer offers as evidence the results of a
survey of decisions in those courts before the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871: "By 1871, thirteen states had adopted the absolute
immunity rule [and] six states had ruled that judges were liable if they
."110 With these assertions one can compare the
acted maliciously ..
judgment of Chief Justice Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, an
observer more familiar with the courts of the day: "There are dicta in
some cases that a justice is civilly responsible when he acts maliciously
or corruptly, but they are not well founded, and the express decisions
are against them. .. ."I
One can reach a proper interpretation only by examining the cases
themselves. The cases cited by the authors noted above deal with justices of the peace (or other quasi-judicial officers) who, as previously
discussed," 2 were liable under the traditional rule of qualified immunity for some abuses of their administrative authority. These cases are
fully consistent with the traditional rules of judicial immunity; none of
them resulted in a judicial officer's being held liable for a judicial act
done within his jurisdiction.' 1 3 The very cases cited by these authors
107. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868), discussed in text accompanying notes
114-17 infra.
108. Ch. 2-, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
109. Feinman & Cohen 237.
110. Yale Note 326-27. See also Note, Immunity of FederalandState Judgesfrom Civil Suit,
supra note 2, at 731.
111. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 478-79 n.2 (2d ed. 1888).
112. See text accompanying notes 42-61 supra.
113. See State ex rel.Robinson v. Littlefield, 4 Blackf. 129 (Ind. 1835) (a justice of the peace
was not liable on his statuory bond); State ex rel. Conley v. Flinn, 3 Blackf. 72 (Ind. 1832) (a
justice of the peace was liable on statutory bond for issuing an execution on the same day he
issued a summons); Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa 153 (1864) (the county board of supervisors was
not liable for an honest mistake); Howe v. Mason, 14 Iowa 510 (1863) (a justice of the peace was
not liable for erroneously approving a replevin bond); Revill v. Pettit, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 314 (1860)
(a justice of the peace was not liable for acts within his jurisdiction); Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298
(1870) (Republican judges of an election were liable for refusing to allow the plaintiff, a Demo-
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for the contrary point strongly suggest that the doctrine of judicial immunity and the rules of that doctrine that had been developed in England were indeed universally accepted in the state courts of the United
States.
In 1868 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case
of Randall v. Brigham,114 an action for damages against a Massachusetts judge who had disbarred the plaintiff. The Court, by Justice
Field, concluded that judges of general jurisdiction were not liable to
civil suit for their judicial acts, even when they acted outside their jurisdiction, "unless, perhaps, when the acts in excess of jurisdiction are
done maliciously or corruptly."' 5 One author has used this phrase of
tentative qualification to attack the continued validity of the doctrine of
judicial immunity;" 6 in light of the historical development of the rules
of judicial immunity as applied to justices of the peace and other inferior officers of justice, however, these words of qualification are not surprising."17 In fact, such a qualification would have to appear in any
statement of a rule of immunity that attempted to cover all the functions of both judges and justices of the peace, and would enable the
Court to account for the state court dicta discussed above without undertaking a thorough re-examination of those cases.
Three years after Randall, in Bradley v. Fisher,t t8 Justice Field

withdrew his qualifying remarks and explained:
The qualifying words were inserted upon the suggestion that the previous language laid down the doctrine of judicial exemption from
liability to civil actions in terms broader than was necessary for the
case under consideration, and that if the language remained unqualified it would require an explanation of some apparently conflicting
adjudications found in the reports. They were not intended as an
expression of opinion that in the cases supposed such liability would
exist, but to avoid the expression of a contrary doctrine.
In the present case we have looked into the authorities and are
clear, from them, as well as from the principle on which any exempcrat, to vote); State ex rel.Tavel v. Jervey, 36 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 304 (1850) (a tax collector was not
liable for costs for issuing tax execution when the writ of prohibition was later granted); Macon v.
Cook, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 600 (1819) (officers of a court martial were not liable for an
action of trespass); Young v. Herbert, I1 S.C.L. (2 Nott. & McC.) 473 (1819) (a magistrate was not

liable for an erroneous denial of libel); Reid v. Hood, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott. & McC.) 471 (1819) (a
justice of the peace was not liable for error, an interesting discussion of the judicial-ministrial
dichotomy); Cope v. Ramsey, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 197 (1870) (justices of a county court were not
liable for an error); Hoggatt v. Bigley, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 236 (1845) (a justice of the peace, a
constable, and a juror were not liable for errors in judgment).
114. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
115. Id. at 536.
116. Yale Note 325-26.
117. See text accompanying notes 42-61 supra.
118. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
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tion is maintained, that the qualifying words used were not necessary

to a correct statement of the law, and that judges of courts of superior
or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial

acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.

19

In Randall Justice Field had restated the doctrine of judicial immunity as it had been expounded by English and American judges
from Coke to Kent. In Bradley Field went beyond a bare statement of
the doctrine itself to state two policy bases for judicial immunity: protection of judicial independence and the need for finality. The latter
was a catch-all term for the ends accomplished by a hierarchical appellate system for the correction of error, as discussed above. 20 In all
respects, Field's statement of the rules and doctrine of judicial immu2
nity followed the mainstream of precedent.' '
2. JudicialImmunity and the Civil Rights Acts. Bradley v. Fisher
was decided in 1872. In that year one could say, as Field did, that
judicial immunity was "the settled doctrine of the English courts for
many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the
courts of this country." 2 2 But the era of Bradley v. Fisher was also the
era of Reconstruction; the work of the Reconstruction Congresses radically transformed the relationship of the federal government to the
governments of the several states. This work played a major part in the
creation of the present controversy over judicial immunity.
119. Id. at 351.
120. See text accompanying notes 15-22 supra.
121. Significantly, Justice Field maintained the common law distinction between acts in excess
ofjurisdiction, for which judges could not be held liable, and acts done in "the clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject-matter." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351. His example of absence ofjurisdiction-a probate judge trying a criminal case-also indicates that in the context of judicial immunity he thought of "jurisdiction" as subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 352. An additional
meaning of jurisdiction-the power to order a particular remedy-was not at issue in the case.
The closing words of the opinion make it clear that the Court had considered and rejected the
plaintiff's claim that Judge Fisher had lacked personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Id. at 357.
Feinman and Cohen state that Field's opinion changed the law of judicial immunity in that
"the distinction between excess of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction solidified the notion of
judicial act that always had been the boundary of the immunity of superior judges." Feinman &
Cohen 246. This is the first mention in their article of the "judicial act" concept, a major part of
the judicial immunity doctrine. They fail, however, to distinguish between the judicial-act requirement and the jurisdictional limit on immunity. See notes 118-20 supra and accompanying
text. Feinman and Cohen also claim that "Field suggested ... a judicial act would require adherence to certain fundamental notions of judicial process." Feinman & Cohen 246. In point of
fact, Field made no such suggestion. Indeed, Field wrote that Judge Fisher's failure to afford the
plaintiff an opportunity to show cause why the order of disbarment should not be made, though a
violation of due process, "did not make the act any less a judicial act." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 357.
122. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
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During Reconstruction, Congress enacted several statutes, later
called the Civil Rights Acts, under the enforcement powers granted to
it by the Civil Rights Amendments. One of these acts was the Act of
March 1, 1875,123 which provided that
no citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror
in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors
who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor,
24
and be fined not more than five thousand dollars.'
A Virginia county court judge was arrested and held in custody under
an indictment which alleged that he did "exclude and fail to select as
grand and petit jurors certain citizens . . . of African race and black
2 6 the Supreme Court denied the
color . ... ,125 In Exparle Virginia1
judge's petition for habeas corpus, rejecting the argument that the doc27
trine of judicial immunity prohibited the indictment.
Under Virginia law all male citizens between the ages of twentyone and sixty who were eligible to vote and hold office were subject to
jury duty. If the preparation of a jury list involved no more than the
listing of those eligible to serve, Exparle Virginia would have been an
easy case. Virginia's law, however, required the judge of each county
court to prepare a list of from one hundred to three hundred eligible
inhabitants of the county "'as he shall think well qualified to serve as
jurors, being persons of sound judgment and free from legal exception.' "128 The statute required the county court judge to exercise considerable discretion; under the judicial-ministerial classification,
therefore, this function would be regarded as judicial.
The Court found, however, that the duty of making up jury lists
was a ministerial duty rather than a judicial one, and that therefore the
doctrine of judicial immunity did not apply. The Court recognized, at
least tacitly, the inadequacy of the judicial-ministerial dichotomy:
Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined
by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he
was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting
jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to
one holding the office of a judge ....
That the jurors are selected by
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
Id., 18 Stat. 336-37 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976)).
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340 (1880).
100 U.S. 339 (1880).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349 (Field, J., dissenting).
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a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves,
sheriffs,
129
&c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?
The Court did not really address the soundness of the judicialministerial distinction (as Justice Field intimated in dissent). 130 Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning was effective, for it enabled the majority
to avoid a conflict between two principles of constitutional statureequal protection and judicial independence. Because the act for which
the judge was prosecuted was not judicial, prosecution could not
threaten judicial independence. Indeed, the Court concluded by disavowing the idea that the 1875 Act infringed on judicial immunity: "It
is idle. . . to say that the act of Congress is unconstitutional because it
inflicts penalties upon State judges for their judicial action. It does no
such thing."'

13 1

The possibility that other civil rights statutes might reach a state
judge's judicial acts was not raised for many years. In 1944, when a
California judge was indicted under the criminal provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870,132 the district court remarked: "It is worthy of
note that in nearly three-quarters of a century no similar action has
been passed upon by a court of record."' 33 That 1944 case, United
States v. Chaplin,134 presented the issue absent in Ex parte Virginia:
whether a state judge could be prosecuted in a federal proceeding for
his judicial acts. The indictments left no doubt that the defendant,
Judge Griffin of the city court of Beverly Hills, had acted in his judicial
capacity and witfiin his jurisdiction. For guidance in his deliberations,
Judge O'Connor of the district court turned to the "long line of [judicial immunity] decisions over a period of years which marks the span

of our national existence.

. .

. "3

After reviewing British and Ameri-

can cases, Judge O'Connor explained what he thought would result
from permitting federal prosecutions of judicial acts under the civil
rights statutes:
A decision in favor of the Government in the instant criminal actions
would place the official action of every justice of the peace, municipal or city court judges, Superior Court judges, Appellate Court
judges and Supreme Court judges in our country at the mercy of a
United States Attorney. Every sentence imposed on a defendant
would be subject to review by the representative of the Department
of Justice, and if, in the judgment of the Attorney General of the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 348.
Id. at 359-60 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 348-49.
Ch. 116, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1970)).
United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926, 928 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
54 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
Id. at 928.
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United States or the United States Attorney for the District, the decision deprived the defendant of his civil rights, the judge could be
indicted, tried, and if convicted, punished. Every defendant sentenced to the county jail or the penitentiary is deprived of his civil
rights, and in many instances the civil rights are not revived upon
release. The same reasoning would apply to our Federal Courts. To
sustain the Government's contention would be to destroy the independence of the judiciary and mark36the beginning of the end of an
independent and fearless judiciary.1
Ex parte Virginia and Chaplin were concerned with immunity
from criminal prosecution under the Civil Rights Acts for judicial acts.
Those statutes also gave civil causes of action for civil rights deprivations; these, like their criminal provisions, fell into desuetude after Reconstruction. Although the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871137 imposed civil
liability on any person who under color of state law caused anyone to
be deprived of his civil rights, no federal district court addressed the
question of tort liabilty of judges under the Act's provisions until 1945.
In that year the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Picking
v. PennsylvaniaRailroad1 38 that judicial immunity was not available in
39
actions against judges under what is now section 1983.1
The plaintiffs in Picking claimed that they were arrested illegally
in Pennsylvania under a bench warrant "unlawfully issued on a falsified and substituted pleading"140 by a New York judge. The arrest had
been for "placing an advertisement upon a flag of the United States on
their car . . ,41 The plaintiffs' suit was dismissed at the district
court level for failure to state a cause of action against the twenty-four
named defendants, who included the Pennsylvania Railroad, which
had transported the plaintiffs back to New York as part of their extra42
dition, and the New York judge.'
The Third Circuit reversed; its decision was prompted by the
Supreme Court's then recent holding in Screws v. United States 4 3 that
a state official acts "under color" of state law when he acts with official
power, even though the action itself violates state law. According to
the court in Picking, the Supreme Court's interpretation of "under
color of law" in Screws meant that
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 934.
Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
151 F.2d at 245.

Id.
Id at 245-46.
325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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if the plaintiffs. . were deprived of a federal right by state officials
or officers acting 'under color of any law'-or as may be stated more
aptly in the instant case 'under color of any statute . . . of any

State'-these officials must respond in damages to the plaintiffs as
prescribed by [section 1983]. 44
The Picking court noted with regret the precarious position judges
would occupy under such a rule, but concluded that in light of Screws,
nothing could be done to mitigate their situation:
[W]e are compelled to the conclusion that Congress gave a right of
action sounding in tort to every individual whose federal rights were
trespassed upon by any officer acting under pretense of state law. A
field was created upon which a state officer could not tread without
being guilty of trespass and liable in damages. The concept is clear
enough but the boundaries of the forbidden territory are in-defined.
Mr. Justice Douglas stated the danger vividly when he said in the
Screws decision: "The treacherous ground on which state officialspolice, prosecutors, legislators, and judges-would walk is indicated
by the character and closeness of decisions of this court interpreting
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. .

.

. Those

who enforced local law today might not know for many months (and
meanwhile could not find out) whether what they did deprived some
one of due process of law. The enforcement of a criminal statute so
agencies loose at their
construed would indeed cast law enforcement
145
own risk on a vast uncharted sea."'

The Picking court thus relied upon Justice Douglas's opinion in Screws
to reach a result that was unacceptable to Douglas himself. Douglas
had been dealing with the argument that the criminal provisions of the
Enforcement Act of 1870 were void for vagueness as to the necessary
standard of intent. Douglas had concluded that the Act required specific intent, noting that if "the customary standard of guilt for statutory
crimes" of general intent were to apply, a local law enforcement officer
"commits a Federal offense . . . if he does an act which some court
later holds deprives a person of due process of law. And he is a criminal though his motive was pure and though his purpose was unrelated
to the disregard of any constitutional guarantee."' 146 If the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had interpreted section 1983 in strict accordance with the Screws decision, it would therefore have concluded
that section 1983 required specific intent for liability in damages. It did
not do so.
Despite Picking's faults, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed its example in Burt v. City of New York. 147 In Bottone v.
144. 151 F.2d at 249.
145. Id. (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1945) (plurality opinion)).
146. 325 U.S. at 97.
147. 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946). In a very brief opinion, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
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Lindsley148 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to follow Picking, holding that "to make out a cause of action under the
Civil Rights Statutes, the state court proceedings must have been a
complete nullity, with a purpose to deprive a person of his property
without due process of law." 149 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in McShane v. Moldovan,' 50 distinguished Bollone on its facts
and followed Picking.
Several years after Picking the Supreme Court, in Tenney v.
Brandhove,15 ' addressed the problem of whether the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (section 1983) subjected state legislators to civil liability for actions within the sphere of legislative activity. After taking note of the
history of legislative immunity and the "general language of the 1871
statute," the Court remarked, "We cannot believe that Congress-itself
a staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the
general language before us.'

52

Following Tenney, federal courts

found by analogy a similar immunity for judges. Almost without
exception, these courts rejected Picking, reasoning, as did one court
of appeals, that "the doctrine of judicial immunity is at least as
well grounded in history and reason as is the rule of legislative immunity ...."153 For more than a decade, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit stood alone in following Picking,'54 in fact, one district
court within the Third Circuit announced that in light of Tenney, it no
longer regarded Picking as binding precedent even within that circuit.15 5 In 1966 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit finally
6
abandoned Picking.5

[I]n Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co.... it was held that the "Civil Rights Act" actually
tolled the privilege of a judge. The only protection at present is in the difficulty of proving such cases which is great; but, so far as we can see, any public officer of a state, or of
the United States, will have to defend any action brought in a district court under [the
Civil Rights Act] in which the plaintiff, however irresponsible, is willing to make the
necessary allegations.
Id. at 793.
148. 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948).
149. Id. at 707.
150. 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949).
151. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
152. Id. at 376.
153. Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1955). See also Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d
74 (7th Cir. 1954); Morgan v. Sylvester, 125 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), afdper curam, 220
F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1955); Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Va. 1951).
154. See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
155. United States exrel. Peters v. Carson, 126 F. Supp. 137, 142 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Ginsburg v.
Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1954), a dper curlam, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955).
156. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
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For several years the Supreme Court declined opportunities to address the question of judicial immunity from civil suit under section
1983, denying review of decisions by courts of appeals upholding judicial immunity in such actions.' 57 Then in 1967 the Court heard Pierson
58
v. Ray.'
The plaintiffs in Pierson were "freedom rider" ministers arrested
and charged with breach of the peace for attempting to use segregated
facilities in a Mississippi bus station. The ministers were brought
before a municipal police justice, who convicted them and imposed the
maximum sentence, despite a Supreme Court decision supporting the
ministers' acts that was brought to his attention. On appeal, the ministers were granted a trial de novo in the county court, where they were
victorious. The ministers then brought an unsuccessful action for damages under section 1983 against the arresting officers and the police justice who had convicted them. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the immunity of the defendant justice, but held that
the police officers would be liable in a section 1983 suit for an unconstitutional arrest. 159 Both the ministers and the police officers sought, and
160
were granted, certiorari.
Chief Justice Warren, in his opinion for eight members of the
Court, disposed of the challenge to judicial immunity with facility and
brevity. His opinion devoted one paragraph to the history of the doctrine at common law, 161 and then turned to the effect of the enactment
of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (section 1983):
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by
§ 1983, which makes liable "every person" who under color of law
deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative record
gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale
all common-law immunities. Accordingly, this Court held in Tenney
v. Brandhove. . .that the immunity of legislators for acts within the
legislative role was not abolished. The immunity of judges for acts
within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume
that Congress would 62
have specifically so provided had it wished to
abolish the doctrine.'
The Court was assisted in its determination by the fact, which Warren
noted, that "[s]ince [the] decision in Tenney. . .the courts of appeals
157. Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Francis v.
Crofts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835 (1953).
158. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
159. Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213, 221 (5th Cir. 1965), ae'din part andre'dinpart,386 U.S.
547 (1967).
160. 384 U.S. 938 (1966).
161. 386 U.S. at 553-54.
162. Id. at 554-55.
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have consistently held that judicial immunity is a defense to an action
under §
Justice Douglas, in dissent, severely criticized Chief Justice Warren's reading of the legislative history of section 1983. Douglas noted
that the members of the Forty-second Congress "were not unaware that
certain members of the judiciary were implicated in the state of affairs
which the statute was intended to rectify." 164 He quoted two members
of the Republican majority, Rainey of South Carolina and Beatty of
Ohio, who, during debates on the 1871 Civil Rights Act, criticized the
actions of judges in the Reconstruction South. These congressmen, according to Douglas, had described what Congress believed to be the
conditions in the South and the relevant actions of government officials. "It was against this background," he wrote, "that the section was
passed, and it was against this background that it should be inter5
preted."16
Douglas did not challenge the majority's statement that the legislative history of the 1871 Act did not indicate that Congress intended to
abolish all defenses of immunity to the Act. Instead, he noted that
three members of Congress spoke directly to the issue ofjudicial immunity during the debates on the statute, and that all three "assumed that
. . .judges would be liable"' 166 under section 1983, and hence opposed
its passage. Douglas concluded that "[i]n light of the sharply contested
nature of the issue of judicial immunity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary would have been expressly exempted from the
67
wide sweep of the section, if Congress had intended such a result."'
Nonetheless, he recognized the need for a restrictive interpretation of
section 1983:
It is necessary to exempt judges from liability for the consequences of
their honest mistakes .... But that is far different from saying that
a judge shall be immune from the consequences of any of his judicial
actions, and that he shall not be liable for the knowing and intentional deprivation of a person's civil rights.' 68
Douglas is not alone in criticizing the majority's reading of the legisla163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at
n.9.
Id. at
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 559-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 566 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Screws v. United States, 325
(1945), Justice
Douglas had interpreted the analogous criminal statute to require intentional deprivation of civil
rights in order to save that statute from unconstitutional vagueness under the fifth amendment.
That test, however, does not apply necessarily to statutes creating civil liability, and Douglas did
not refer to his Screws opinion for support in his dissents in Pierson .Ray or Tenney Y.
Brandhove.
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tive history of section 1983. Several authors 169 have attacked the
Court's interpretation as unsound or unjustified. The legislative history

of section 1983, however, leads one to view the Court's efforts more
favorably. There was more to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 than its

first section (which is now section 1983). Other sections of the Act imposed civil and criminal penalties for conspiracies to deprive persons of
their civil rights,1 70 disqualified former Confederate soldiers from serving as jurors in federal courts, 17 1 and gave the President the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to use armed forces to suppress

insurrection. 172 Most of the debate on the Act concerned these provisions; section 1 drew little comment.1 73 As for Douglas's citation of the
objections of those opponents of the 1871 Act who feared that its first

section would abolish judicial immunity, another critic of the Pierson
decision has written that
[n]o proponent of § 1983, which was, after all, but a very minor and
uncontroversial section of the entire Ku Klux Klan Act, appears to
have either confirmed or contradicted [these apprehensions]. Fol-

lowing traditional canons of statutory interpretation, the majority felt
free to4 disregard as hyperbolic, the comments of opposing legislators.

17

The issue of abrogation of judicial immunity was therefore not at all
"sharply contested," as Justice Douglas claimed.

As with many enactments, the proponents of the Act apparently
had no concern whatsoever about judicial immunity and certainly did
not propose its abolition. In such situations, the Court can look to
maxims of construction and considerations of public policy, as it did in
Pierson.17 5 The Court quite properly concluded that it should not attri169. See the sources cited in notes 2 & 4 supra.
170. Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976)).
171. Ch. 22, § 5, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
172. Id. § 4 (effective until 1874).
173. See, eg., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (discussing section 1). Indeed, the Republicans whom Douglas quoted, who asserted the evils of judicial
administration in the southern states, were debating the merits of the secondsectionof the Act, the
section dealing with conspiracy, not the civil provisions of section 1.
174. Kates, supra note 2, at 620 n.19.
175. Yet one cannot but note the superficial incongruence of Pierson with the Court's decision
in Screws a few years earlier. The statute construed in Pierson was modeled on the 1866 and 1871
acts that were the subject of Screws, compare42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) with 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976);
yet Pierson held judges exempt from the operation of section 1983, though the rule of Screws
would impose criminal liability for intentional deprivations of federal rights. By comparison, the
qualified "good faith" immunity granted to police officers in Pierson accords with the Screws rule.
That point, coupled with the fact that the actual defendants in Screws were police officers, reduces
the contrast between the two holdings to some extent. The best explanation of the difference in
construction is that of legislative history: the record of section 1983 was devoid of any basis for an
intent standard, while that of section 242 was replete with such evidence, see Kates, supranote 2,
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bute to Congress an intention to abolish a long-standing doctrine with
a strong basis in public policy, unless Congress clearly states such a
purpose.
3. JudicialImmunity Today-Stump v. Sparkman. The leading
recent case on judges' immunity from civil liability is Stump v. Sparkman. 176 Feinman and Cohen express dissatisfaction with the outcome
of the case and with its analysis of policy, but they are unable to resolve
its problems to their own satisfaction. 177 Nevertheless, a satisfactory
resolution of those problems on fairly simple policy grounds is indeed
possible. An initial review of the facts of the case will help both to
show the difficulties with judicial immunity that the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court encountered, and to highlight the usefulness of
the doctrine's history in arriving at a suitable contemporary policy.
(a) Thefacts. In 1971, when Linda Kay Sparkman was fifteen
years old, her mother, Ora Spitler McFarlin, sought a court order authorizing Linda's sterilization. Mrs. McFarlin's attorney drafted a document captioned "Petition To Have Tubal Ligation Performed on
Minor and Indemnity Agreement," and presented it to Judge Harold
D. Stump of the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Indiana.
The petition was an unusual document.' 78 It included Mrs. McFarlin's affidavit that her daughter Linda was a minor and "somewhat
retarded" although she attended public school and had "been passed
along with other children in her age level."' 79 The petition also stated
that Linda had spent nights with men; and that since Mrs. McFarlin
could not maintain a watch over her daughter, it would be in Linda's
best interests if she underwent a tubal ligation "to prevent unfortunate
circumstances."' 8 0 The petition contained Mrs. McFarlin's unilateral
"agreement" to indemnify and hold harmless the physician who was to
perform the tubal ligation and the hospital where the operation was to
take place.
At the bottom of the second page of the petition a typewritten parat 621-24-and the language of section 242 was changed in 1909 to confine liability to those who
had acted "willfully." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945). Given the differences in
the history of the two statutes, the Court's somewhat different treatment of the statutes is appropriate. Certainly its interpretation of section 1983 is at least as defensible as the specific intent interpretation Justice Douglas offered.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

435 U.S. 349 (1978).
Feinman & Cohen 280.
The petition is reproduced in full in the Supreme Court opinion, 435 U.S. at 351-53 n.l.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
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agraph stated that Judge Stump approved the petition.181 The legal
effect of this paragraph is unclear; one author has suggested that the
petition and order of approval may have had no legal effect whatsoever, since the petition did not ask for any affirmative relief.182 The
existence of the threshold question of judicial immunity made it unnecessary for any of the reviewing courts to address the shortcomings of
the document. Whatever the legal impact of his approval, Judge
Stump signed the petition the day it was presented, as respondent
Sparkman described in her brief to the Supreme Court,
in an ex parte manner in an undisclosed location ....

There was

no appointment of a guardian adlitem to represent Linda's interests.
The petition was not filed with the DeKalb Circuit Court. No notice
was given to Linda or anyone on her
8 3 behalf of the petition, which
was approved without any hearing.
Eight days later the sterilization was performed. Linda had been told
that she was being hospitalized for an appendectomy; several days later
she was released, still unaware that she had been sterilized. Two years
later she married, and two years after her marriage she learned for the
first time that she had been sterilized. Linda and her husband then
brought suit, under the federal civil rights statutes, l84 against her
mother, the attorney who prepared the petition, Judge Stump, the doctors who performed the operation, and the hospital where the operation
took place, attaching pendent state claims for assault and battery, medical malpractice, and loss of potential parenthood. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the federal claims, holding that only the actions
of Judge Stump constituted the state action necessary to state a claim
under sections 1983 and 1985(3), and that Judge Stump was absolutely
85
immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity.
(b) The Seventh Circuit decision. On appeal the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed the judgment of the district court.1 8 6 Neither the parties nor the court of appeals questioned

the validity of the doctrine of judicial immunity. Nor was it contended
that Pierson v. Ray187 had been erroneously decided. The court began
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Laycock, supra note 4, at 393.
Brief for Respondents at 3, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(c) (1976).
Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 1976), rey'd,552 F.2d 172 (7th

Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
186. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349 (1978).
187. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See text accompanying notes 158-75 supra.
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by citing Bradley v. Fisher188 for the traditional formula restricting judicial immunity to judicial acts performed within a judge's jurisdiction,
or at least not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. To the
court "the crucial issue.. . upon which immunity turns, is whether
Judge Stump acted within his jurisdiction when he approved the petition to have Linda Sparkman sterilized."' 8 9 Logically, the first question under Bradley would have been whether Judge Stump's act was
judicial, but the court overlooked that part of the test.
The court then stated that for questions of judicial immunity, "jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, citing Bradley for support. 90 This line of attack committed the court to
demonstrating that the subject matter of Mrs. McFarlin's petition was
clearly outside the broad statutory grant of jurisdiction to Indiana circuit courts:
Jurisdiction.-Said court shall have original exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases at law and in equity whatsoever ...and it shall have jurisdiction of all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive
jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court,
board or officer. 19 1
To evade the broad sweep of this statute, the court ignored the second
part of the statutory grant ("all other causes") in formulating its test for
subject matter jurisdiction: "A claim must be characterized as a case in
law or equity in order to come within the statute."1 92 The court then
shifted to an examination of Judge Stump's power to order sterilization, a different matter entirely. 9 3
The court first considered the possible statutory bases for the
power to order sterilization, and found none. Indeed, the court said
that "[t]he statutory scheme in existence at the time in fact negated his
188. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
189. 552 F.2d at 174.
190. Id. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Professor Laycock has argued
that the rule of immunity stated in Bradley is ambiguous in its references to jurisdiction, and may
refer to personal jurisdiction as well as to subject matter jurisdiction. Laycock, supra note 4, at
404-05, The better view is that the jurisdictional limit on immunity as used in that case refers to
subject matter jurisdiction, for the reasons discussed earlier. See notes 114-21 supraand accompanying text. See also Dobbs.
For a vigorous attack on the notion of jurisdiction over the person as notice of hearing, see
Gordon, The Observance of Law as a Conditionof JurisdictionII, 47 L.Q. Rav. 557 (1931).
191. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975).

192. 552 F.2d at 174.
193. Id. For a discussion of the notion of jurisdiction as power to order a particular remedy,
see E. HENDERSON, supra note 85, at 117-21; Gordon, Excess of Jurisdiction in Sentencing or
AwardingRelief, 55 L.Q. REv. 521 (1939). Lord Justice Ormrod takes issue with the notion in his
opinion in Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, 150 (C.A.). See also Z. CHAFEE, supra note 81,
ch. 9.
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right to assert any jurisdiction over the petition."' 194 The court reasoned that the very existence of statutes authorizing the sterilization of
institutionalized persons under certain circumstances and after specified procedures "clearly negates jurisdiction to consider sterilization in
cases not involving institutionalized persons and in which these procedures are not followed."' 195 These words show that the court of appeals
confused the existence of jurisdiction over the subject of a petition for
an order of sterilization with the correctness of a court's decision to
grant the relief sought.
The court of appeals then found that Judge Stump had failed to
comply with due process requirements, and that this failure took his
actions outside the statutory grant of jurisdiction over "cases at law or
in equity."' 196 The notion that due process errors strip a court of its
jurisdiction-and hence strip the judge of that court of his immunityis uniquely at variance with both theory and precedent. That interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction would render the doctrine of immunity a nullity; the jurisdictional limit would swallow the rule.
Because the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not face
a challenge to the continued validity of the doctrine of judicial immunity or even to the validity of the Bradley v. Fisher formula, that court
never discussed how the public policy considerations underlying the
doctrine of judicial immunity related to the facts and issues of Sparkman, or how well the Bradley formula served these policies. The
Supreme Court unfortunately repeated that mistake on review.
(c) The Supreme Court opinion. Writing for the majority of the
Supreme Court, Justice White framed the issue by stating: "This case
requires us to consider the scope of a judge's immunity from damages
liability when sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' 97 The Court evidently
thought that Sparkman required consideration neither of the purposes
ofjudicial immunity nor of how those purposes might relate to the immunity's scope, undoubtedly because the parties did not challenge the
validity of the doctrine.
Like the court of appeals, the Supreme Court began by citing the
judicial immunity formula stated in Bradley v. Fisher. The Court also
agreed that, under the Bradley formula, "the necessary inquiry in determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit is whether at
the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the sub194. 552 F.2d at 175.
195. Id.

196. Id. at 176.
197. 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978).
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ject matter before him."19 8 Forgotten for the moment was the restriction of immunity to "judicial acts" that was part of the Bradley
formula. The Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that the Indiana statutory framework for the sterilization of institutionalized persons deprived Judge Stump of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
petitions requesting authorization of sterilization. Justice White noted
the breadth of the Indiana statutory grant of jurisdiction and pointed
out the fault in the court of appeals' logic: "The statutory authority for
the sterilization of institutionalized persons in the custody of the State
does not warrant the inference that a court of general jurisdiction has
no power to act on a petition for sterilization of a minor in the custody
of her parents . ...
199 Nor would the Court accept the conclusion
that the grave procedural defects committed by Judge Stump in handling Mrs. McFarlin's petition resulted in "an illegitimate exercise of
his common law power" that "does not fall within the categories of
cases at law and equity.' ' 2°° This argument, the Court recognized, con20
fused the existence of authority with its proper exercise. '
Justice White next turned his attention to the argument that the
same procedural defects took Judge Stump's actions outside the scope
of "judicial acts." White claimed the Court had not previously "had
occasion to consider, for purposes of the judicial immunity doctrine,
the necessary attributes of a judicial act," 20 2 ignoring the discussion in
Exparte Virginia20 3 about whether the selection of jurors was a judicial
or ministerial function. Nor did he mention the long line of cases in
which a multitude of English and American courts had, during the last
four centuries, distinguished judicial acts from administrative and legislative functions. 2 °4 After discussing two cases, 205 neither of which involved the problem of distinguishing a judge's judicial functions from
his other official duties, Justice White created a new rule for defining
judicial acts:
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether
an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate to the nature of the act
itself, Le., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,
198. Id at 356.
199. Id. at 358.
200. 552 F.2d at 176.
201. 435 U.S. at 359.
202. Id. at 360.
203. 100 U.S. 339 (1879). See text accompanying notes 125-31 supra.
204. See notes 52-55, 62-69, 125-31 supra and accompanying text.
205. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (the Illinois Supreme Court's rejection of a petition
for admission to the state bar constitutes a "case or controversy"); McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d
1280 (5th Cir. 1972) (acts in a judge's chambers can be judicial).
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and to the expectations of the parties,
je., whether they dealt with the
2 °6
judge in his judicial capacity.
Certainly a new rule was not necessary merely to avoid the respondents' argument that Judge Stump's actions were not judicial because of
their procedural irregularity. That argument confuses "judicial" with
"judicious"; almost any definition of "judicial act" would have sufficed
to refute it. If the Court was uncomfortable with any particular definition, it could have merely pointed out the essence of respondents' mistake.
The dissenters attacked the majority's "judicial act" rule most vigorously. They contended that Judge Stump's actions were not judicial
and hence that judicial immunity did not protect those actions. Justice
Stewart argued that the term "judicial act" must be defined by the policies supporting judicial immunity:
It seems to me, rather, that the concept of what is a judicial act
must take its content from a consideration of the factors that support
immunity from liability for the performance of such an act. Those
factors were accurately summarized by the Court in Pierson v.
Ray...:
[I]t "is ...

for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is

that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences. . .

."

It

is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that
are brought before him, including controversial cases that
arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may
be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice
or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.
Not one of the considerations thus summarized in the Pierson
opinion was present here. There was no "case," controversial or
otherwise. There were no litigants. There was and could be no appeal. And there was not even the pretext of principled decision making. The total absence of any of these normal attributes of a judicial
proceeding convinces me
that the conduct complained of in this case
20 7
was not a judicial act.
Stewart's dissent in Sparkman is noteworthy for suggesting, for the
first time, that the limits of judicial immunity should be defined by the
policies giving rise to the doctrine. Yet he, like the majority, confined
himself to the elements of the familiar rule of Bradley v. Fisher. Instead of directly defining the scope of judicial immunity by looking to
its policy basis, Stewart would use that policy basis to define "judicial
acts." Because the term "judicial act" has importance outside the con206. 435 U.S. at 362.
207. Id. at 368-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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text of judicial immunity, however, it should not be defined by policies
limited to that context. Surely whether an act is judicial depends on the
character of the act. Stewart's suggestion demonstrates how limiting
the Court's focus to a particular formula of the rules of judicial immunity restricts its analysis and directs it away from the important issue of
the proper scope of the doctrine itself.
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion also concentrated on the "judicial act" element of the Bradley formula. The "central feature" in
Sparkman, he wrote, was Judge Stump's "preclusion of any possibility
for the vindication of respondents' rights elsewhere in the judicial system. ' 20 8 Powell noted that the Bradley Court accepted the injustices
the doctrine ofjudicial immunity sometimes imposes because those injustices are usually mitigated by the availability of appeal.
But where a judicial officer acts in a manner that precludes all
resort to appellate or other judicial remedies that otherwise would be
available, the underlying assumption of the Bradley doctrine is inoperative ...
In sum, I agree with Mr. Justice Stewart that petitioner judge's
actions were not "judicial," and that he is entitled to no judicial im-

munity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.209

Again, the result Powell argues for would be correct, but would be
achieved by the indirect route of defining the concept of "judicial act"
by a policy that should limit the operation of judicial immunity directly.
The many criticisms of the Sparkman opinion as being hypocritical self-dealing by the judiciary show that observers expected the Court
to explain why this particular judge's actions deserved protection. The
majority did not provide an acceptable explanation largely because the
parties in Sparkman did not challenge the doctrine of judicial immunity, and the Court thus did not examine it. Nevertheless, the validity
of the doctrine was implicitly challenged by the facts of Sparkman, and
the Court's failure to recognize and respond to the challenge detracted
greatly from its decision.
(d) Sparkman-sprogeny. Courts facing judicial immunity questions after Sparkman have focused on the "judicial act" rule stated in
that case. Some courts have had little difficulty determining if the acts
complained of in a given case were judicial.2 10 For example, in a wellpublicized recent case, Harrisv. Harey,211 the acts complained of were
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 369 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See, eg., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980).
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clearly extra-judicial libels: almost any rule, even that stated in Sparkman, would have sufficed to distinguish such unofficial from judicial
acts. This case concerned a section 1983 action by a black police officer
against a state court judge who publicly called the plaintiff "a fixer, a
briber, and a sycophant," 2 12 and called for his dismissal from the police
force. The judge also made repeated racial remarks about the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the judge's defense of judicial immunity on the grounds that "Judge Harvey's attacks
on plaintiff were not part of his duties .... ,,213
Rheuark v. Shaw, 2 14 however, presented an instance of a suit
against a judge for an official, but not judicial, act. Several convicts
sought damages and injunctive relief under section 1983 for long delays
in the transcription of their trial court proceedings for use on appeal.
The trial judge who presided over the trials of all the plaintiffs, and his
court reporter-among others-were defendants in all the actions. The
defendant judge asserted judicial immunity as a defense. The plaintiffs
claimed to be damaged by the judge's appointment of the defendant
court reporter, by the judge's failure to insure that the reporter prepared the plaintiffs' statements of facts in a timely manner, and by the
judge's failure to appoint additional court reporters. In short, they
complained that the judge had neglected his administrative duties. Responding to these complaints, the district court applied the Sparkman
test: "When judicial immunity for an act is asserted, the court must
determine whether that act is a function normally performed by a judge
[and] whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity
215 Naturally, the court found the acts complained of to be judi....
in
nature; judges normally appoint and supervise court reporters,
cial
and the parties certainly had dealt with the defendant judge in his judicial capacity.
One cannot imagine a clearer demonstration of the flaws in the
Sparkman rule.2 16 The actions complained of bore none of the
hallmarks of the judicial function discussed previously: no controversy
212. 605 F.2d at 335.
213. Id. at 337.
214. 477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
215. Id. at 919 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362-63).
216. The circumstances of Rheuark v. Shaw make it somewhat surprising that the district court
did not note the administrative nature of the defendant judge's actions. County Judge Whittington was also a defendant in the case. As presiding officer of the Dallas County Commissioners
Court, he was sued for limiting the amount of money spent by district judges for court reporters,
and for his efforts to discourage the appointment of additional court reporters. The district court
recognized that the functions of the Commissioners Court included "the legislative and administrative duties of managing. . . the county budget and approving expenditures of county funds
.... " and that "Judge Whittington's violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights were actions
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was determined, no hearing was held, no binding determination was
made, no objective standards were applied, no rights were declared.
Clearly, the acts of the defendant trial judge were administrative, dealing only with the public service of the defendant court reporter. 21 7 As
such, the judge should not have been entitled to the absolute immunity
that protects judicial acts, but only to the limited, good-faith protection
21 s
appropriate for administrative actions.
Rheuark v. Shaw highlighted the uselessness of the Sparkman "judicial act" test for distinguishing a judge's judicial functions from his
administrative duties-a problem not present in Sparkman. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. ABA 2 19 shows that the Sparkman
test fares no better at drawing a line between judicial and legislative
functions. In that case, two consumer groups sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of Virginia state bar disciplinary prohibitions on lawyer advertising, and sought reimbursement for
costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution of their action
against the Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court of Virginia, the
Chief Justice of that court, and two officers of the state bar.220 A threejudge district court held that the individual defendants were protected
by judicial immunity from personal liability for attorneys' fees:
The record reflects that defendant Supreme Court of Virginia
has the jurisdiction to adopt, modify, or refuse to modify the Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility .... Chief Justice I'Anson's
actions, as a member of the Supreme Court of Virginia, relating to
the Court's failure to amend or repeal DR2-102(A)(6), were clearly
judicial acts within the Court's jurisdiction; Chief Justice I'Anson
therefore in the instant case enjoys absolute immunity from individual liability for attorneys fees. 22 '
Nonetheless, the court went on to hold that judicial immunity did not
protect the defendants in their official capacities from liability for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976:
which were taken as part of his legislative and administrative duties in governing Dallas County,
and were not judicial acts." 477 F. Supp. at 921.
See also Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), modoed on other grounds, 583 F.2d 779
(5th Cir. 1978), overruled on othergrounds, 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (overruled insofar as it

extended a derivative immunity to private persons who conspire with judges), in which the court
applied the Sparkman rule with similar results, although with less discussion.
217. Cf.Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (judicial immunity does not extend to the
preparation of jury lists). See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra.
218. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
219. 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers
Union, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (1980).
220. The ABA had been dismissed as a party defendant with the consent of the parties. 470 F.
Supp. at 1057 n.l.
221. Id. at 1059.
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"Both the extensive legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as well as
the numerous court opinions interpreting the statute clearly indicate
that all branches and agencies of state governments may be liable for
'22 2
attorneys fees in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.
District Judge Warriner, in dissent, found it unnecessary to address the majority's conclusion that section 1988 was intended to abrogate judicial immunity from awards of attorneys' fees. He thought the
actions complained of were legislative, not judicial:
This Court has previously indicated that the Supreme Court of Virginia acts in a legislative capacity in adopting disciplinary rules....
This view is readily supported by analysis. Disciplinary rules are
rules of general application and are statutory in character. They act
not on parties litigant but on all those who practice law in Virginia.
They do not arise out of a controversy which must be adjudicated,
but instead out of a need to regulate conduct for the protection of all
rules, the Supreme
citizens. It is evident that, in enacting disciplinary
223
Court of Virginia is constituted a legislature.
Judge Warriner went on to argue that section 1988 was not intended to
abrogate legislative immunity. Because the only acts of the Virginia
Supreme Court complained of were, in his view, legislative, the Virginia Supreme Court retained its immunity. Only the Virginia State
Bar had acted to enforce the ban on attorney advertising; hence, by
Warriner's reasoning, only the Virginia State Bar might properly be
22 4
sued for attorneys' fees.
Judge Warmer's analysis of the nature of a judicial act would not
be remarkable were it not for the confusion created by Sparkman. In
his own words the analysis was
nothing more than a common sense approach to the question of official immunity. These immunities are the creatures of public policy,
and depend necessarily upon the function being performed by the
official when he does the acts for which he is called upon to answer.
The title of the office in no way determines the scope and character
of the privilege enjoyed by the incumbent. Thus, the fact that the
Supreme Court of Virginia is comprised entirely of judges does not
determine the scope and character of the privilege enjoyed by the
Supreme Court when it enacts disciplinary rules. If the function22is5
legislative, then the applicable privilege is the legislative privilege.
The Supreme Court subscribed to Judge Warriner's reasoning in
222. Id. at 1060.
223. Id. at 1064 (citations omitted).
224. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), award of attorneys' fees is discretionary. In light of efforts by the Virginia State Bar and its officers to amend DR2-102(A)(6), the majority ruled that
"special circumstances would make unjust any award of attorneys fees against defendant State
Bar or against [its officers] in their official capacities as State Bar officers." 470 F. Supp. at 1062.
225. 470 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
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overturning the three-judge panel's disposition of the case. 226 The
Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice White, held that the
Virginia Supreme Court's actions were legislative, not judicial. 227 Ac228 Simicordingly, the actions were protected by legislative immunity.
larly, the Court held that this legislative immunity barred the
assessment of section 1988 attorneys' fees against the Virginia Supreme
22 9

Court.

The Court affirmed the validity of the doctrine of judicial immunity, but conspicuously omitted any discussion of the Sparkman judicial-act test: "Adhering to the doctrine of Bradley v. Fisher. . . , we
have held that judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute
immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial
capacities." 230 The opinion also acknowledged the split among the various circuits as to whether judicial immunity bars injunctive or declaratory relief.2 3 1 Justice White sidestepped that problem: "We need not
decide whether judicial immunity would bar prospective relief, for we
believe that the Virginia Supreme Court and its Chief Justice properly
were held liable on their enforcement capacities. '232 The district court,
however, had held the Virginia court liable in its judicial capacity, not
for any enforcement actions. 233
II.
A.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The Judicial-Act Requirement.

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the brief legacy of
Sparkman has been disarray and dissatisfaction. Courts applying
Sparkman have been misled by that decision's inadvertent redefinition
of the concept of a judicial act. Justice White's statement that the
Supreme Court had not previously had occasion to consider the necessary attributes of a judicial act in the context of judicial immunity is
simply wrong. Judging from the opinion, White was not aware of the
discussion in Exparte Virginia when he set down his test for a judicial
act;234 judging from the test itself, White was unaware of the need to
distinguish judicial acts from administrative or legislative acts in the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

100 S. Ct. 1967, 1974-75 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 1975.
Id. at 1977.
Id. at 1976.
Id. & n.13.
See id. at 1976 (emphasis added).
See 470 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
See text accompanying notes 202-06 supra.
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context of judicial immunity. Rather, the opinion asks "whether [an

act] is a function normally performed by a judge," i e., whether it is an
official act, and "whether [the parties] dealt with the judge in his judi-

cial capacity"-which means in his official capacity, according to the
authority the Court cited. 235 The opinion does not clarify why an act
that is by nature judicial might be made non-judicial by the expectations of the parties. 2 36 A better analysis of the facts of Sparkman and
the doctrine of judicial immunity calls for a return to the traditional
3 7
approach to the judicial-act requirement.

B.

The JurisdictionalLimit.
The historical discussion above23 8 suggests that the jurisdictional

limit on immunity-whatever is left of it-is ripe for elimination. For
centuries the jurisdictional limit has not been applied to judges of supe-

rior courts. The distinction between superior courts and inferior courts
regarding judicial immunity has fallen into desuetude in those American jurisdictions that have not expressly abolished it,239 and for good
reason. As applied to inferior courts, the jurisdictional limit on immu-

nity was a consequence of the ossified system of review by prerogative
writ, and provided a needed remedy for damages from official action

when many of the functions of government were performed by justices
of the peace using judicial forms and procedures. The jurisdictional
limit once served a purpose when it was applied to administrative func-

tions, but that purpose is not served by applying the jurisdictional limit
to judicial functions in a modern legal system. It is an anachronism
240
that fosters nothing but confusion, and it should be eliminated.
235. 435 U.S. at 362.
236. The hypothetical case of a non-judicial act being characterized as judicial as a result of
the expectations of the parties should convince the reader that the Sparkman judicial-act rule, see
text accompanying note 206 supra, is conjunctive rather than disjunctive. See also Feinman &
Cohen 257-58.
237. See text accompanying notes 62-69 supra.
238. See notes 70-96 supra and accompanying text.
239. The following cases abolished any such distinction between inferior and superior courts:
Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980); McDaniel v. Harrell, 81 Fla. 66, 86 So. 631 (1921);
Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898); Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 61 N.W.
1004 (1895); Shaw v. Moon, 117 Or. 558, 245 P. 318 (1926); Kalb v. Luce, 234 Wis. 509, 291 N.W.
841 (1940).
In 1975 Her Majesty's Court of Appeal abolished the distinction between superior and inferior courts regarding the jurisdictional limit on judicial immunity. Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B.
118 (C.A.). See also Feinman & Cohen 261-62 (discussing Sirros).
240. The jurisdictional limit on immunity has had a less than glorious history in its application
to what are regarded as judicial acts. See the discussion of The Marshalsea, notes 70-80 supra and
accompanying text.
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The Malice Standard.

Almost without exception, critics of the doctrine of judicial immunity have agreed on one point: It is one thing, they say, to protect a

judge from his honest mistakes, but it is something quite different for
the judicial system to protect judges who purposely use their authority
to inflict harm or deprive others of their rights. For this reason, some

have called for judicial liability under an "actual malice" standard:
"Applied to a judicial officer, this would mean that an action would

[result in liability] if it was done with actual knowledge that it was incorrect or with reckless disregard of whether it was incorrect or not." 24'

Proponents argue that adopting this standard would deter judicial acts
"motivated by prejudice, bias, anger, or ill-will, or the result of inattention, neglect of duty, or incompetence. 2 42 In addition, of course, any
diminution of judicial immunity would increase the compensation for
those wronged by judicial malefaction.
The chief drawback to this proposal is that most aggrieved litigants would readily allege that a judge's conduct had been malicious,
or had met any other requisite standard, and the truth of such allegations could not be determined without a trial; the damage to the poli-

cies supporting immunity would be inflicted by the fact of a trial, no

matter what the verdict.2 43 The most effective argument against the
malice standard, however, is that the premises underlying it are mis-

taken. Judicial immunity exists not to protect judges but to protect litigants.
This freedom from action and question at the suit of an individual is
given by law to the Judges, not so much for their own sake as for the
sake of the public, and for the advancement ofjustice, that being free
241. Yale Note 322 n.3.
242. Feinman & Cohen 271.
243. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). One critic of the Sparkman
decision noted that
[w]hile it may initially appear unjust to protect the corrupt actions of judges, the difficulty in distinguishing between frivolous and legitimate claims would be significant. Although it has been argued that frivolous suits could be disposed of through summary
judgment procedures under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are
two problems with this proposed solution. Subjecting a judge's record of evidence, authorities and arguments to discovery prior to summary judgment would create problems.
In addition, summary judgment is particularly inappropriate when intent is relevant,
credibility is an issue or when relevant information is peculiarly within the knowledge of
the moving party. Thus, suits charging a judge with malice or corruption could not be
easily disposed of under summary judgment procedures. The Court's reluctance to
adopt a standard of actual malice in imposing judicial liability is, therefore, understandable.
47 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 81,93 (1978). See also Brazier, Judiciallmmunityand the Independ.
ence of the Judiciary, 1976 PUB. L. 397.
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from actions they may be free in thought and independent in judg244
ment, as all who are to administer judgment ought to be.
On the basis of "modem social theory, including modem legal theory, ' 245 Feinman and Cohen conclude that this policy argument cannot
be resolved in any objectively satisfying manner:
Values are subjective because they are solely a matter of individual
choice and they are arbitrary because once the choice is made little is
left to be said. Values are not subject to rational debate or discussion
and one person can rarely persuade another of the rightness of certain values because of the irreconcilable antinomy of reason and
value. . . . [T]he resolution of the policy formula requires a weighing of the costs of a liability rule against the benefits. Weighing implies a scale, an objective measure, but the choice among competing
values is itself reflective of more basic values and is therefore subjective and arbitrary. .

.

. Each decisionmaker values compensating

injured parties, sanctioning wrongdoers, and maintaining the efficiency of the legal system, but when those common values conflict, as
no independent means of resolving
in the judicial liability context,
2 46
the conflict is available.
This sort of conclusion is more an indictment of relativism than of legal
reasoning. When one evaluates value choices in a legal context, one is
not trying to prove the validity or truth of a scale of values, but only the
consistency of that value choice with other value choices made, accepted, and legitimated by society. The inconsistency of according absolute immunity for the protection of judicial independence, but only
qualified immuiity for the protection of the independence of most
other government officials, is what one finds disturbing about the doctrine of judicial immunity-not the subjectivity of value judgments, as
Feinman and Cohen suggest.
D. An Alternate Proposal.
The salient feature of Sparkman is that the defendant judge's actions deprived Linda Kay Sparkman of the opportunity to seek appellate relief from his judgment. According to the view of judicial
immunity stated by both the majority and the dissenters in Sparkman,
the only significance of appeal in the context of judicial immunity is
that its availability mitigates some of the harsher consequences of the
doctrine. If that were indeed the only significance of appeal, then its
unavailability in any particular case would be nothing more than an
unfortunate circumstance, affecting the general cost-benefit calculus by
which the utility of the doctrine of judicial immunity is evaluated, but
244. Garnett v. Ferrand, 108 Eng. Rep. 576, 581 (K.B. 1827).
245. Feinman & Cohen 278.
246. Id. 278-79.
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not bearing on the validity of the application of the doctrine in that
particular case.
The earlier discussion of the origins of judicial immunity shows,
however, that appeal has a much greater significance in the context of
judicial immunity. 247 Judicial immunity developed to protect the appellate system from collateral attacks on judgments, thus channeling
actions upward through the appellate hierarchy for the correction of
error. The availability of appellate correction of error is, therefore, absolutely central to the logic of judicial immunity. For this reason, judicial immunity should not be available when, as in Sparkman, the
actions complained of prevented the complainant from seeking normal
appellate correction of error.
The limiting principle proposed here is hardly radical. At its most
fundamental level, it is nothing more than an application of the maxim
cessanterationelegis cessatipsa lex (where the reason for the rule stops,

there stops the rule).248 Its application would leave the vast majority of
precedents undisturbed 249 and would deny immunity only in cases like
Sparkman, in which the judge's actions denied the plaintiff access to
the appellate system. The standard would be a return to sound precedent and would result very neatly in the establishment of limits on judicial immunity that are determined by the policy basis of the doctrine. 250
III.

CONCLUSION

The rising popularity of section 1983 suits is likely to cause increasing numbers of judges to seek the protection of judicial immunity.
If recent lower court decisions are any indication of what the future
holds, most of the problems of judicial immunity will result from mistakes the Supreme Court made in Stump v. Sparkman. At the very
247. See text accompanying notes 11-28 supra.
248. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 157-58
(6th ed. 1977); Kocourek & Koven, Renovation ofthe Common Law Though Stare Decisis, 29 ILL.
L. REV. 971 (1935).
249. The question arises whether judicial immunity should be denied when the actions complained of constitute breaches of a judge's obligation to follow decisions of courts superior to his
own. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dall. 160 (Pa. 1792); and, arguably, Consumers Union of the United States v. ABA, 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'dsub
nom. Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 100 S. Ct. 1967 (1980), fall into this category.
Judicial immunity did not develop to enforce the authority of the decisions of reviewing courts,
but rather developed to channel procedures in error upwards through the appellate hierarchy by
barring certain collateral attacks.
250. The legitimacy of such a limit on judicial immunity is established not by a welfare analysis or a balancing of interests, such as that which disturbs Feinman and Cohen, see text accompanying note 246 supra, but by its derivation from the same policies which led to the development of
judicial immunity.
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least, the Court should clarify the term "judicial act." Moreover, the
Court should recognize that a reasonable definition of that concept,
and the development of means of judicial review of administrative action other than by prerogative writ, have obviated any need for the
jurisdictional limit on immunity. Finally, the Court should recognize
that the most important policy that judicial immunity serves is the protection of the appellate system from improper collateral attacks on
judgments and, therefore, that invoking judicial immunity to protect
acts that prevent access to appellate review must not be permitted.

